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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The order from which this appeal was taken (hereinafter the "Order")1 consists of 
a preliminary injunction, a discovery protective order, and an order disqualifying 
plaintiffs' counsel. The appropriate standard of review for all issues is an "abuse of 
discretion" standard. 
This Court "will not disturb a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction 
unless the district court abused its discretion or rendered a decision against the clear 
weight of the evidence." Water & Energy Svs. Tech., Inc. v. Keil 1999 UT 16, f 6, 974 
P.2d 821, 822. For over 70 years, this Court has consistently left preliminary injunctions 
"to the conscience of the chancellor." See Melrose v. Low, 80 Utah 356, 15 P.2d 319, 
320 (Utah 1932).2 Preliminary injunctions are equitable, and "courts have broad 
authority to grant equitable relief as needed." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1243 (Utah 
1998). 
The Court has repeatedly "stated that the district court is entrusted with broad 
discretion in dealing with discovery matters, namely, protective orders." In re Discipline 
of Pendleton. 2000 UT 77, t 38, 11 P.3d 284, 294. See R & R Energies v. Mother Earth 
Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). This Court applies this deferential 
standard "'[bjecause trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery 
process.'" Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995)(citation 
omitted). 
With respect to decisions on disqualification of counsel, "the proper standard of 
review . . . is abuse of discretion." Houghton v. Utah Dep't of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 
1
 A copy of the Order is attached as Addendum 1. 
2
 See also Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, ^ 26, 37 P.3d 1112; System Concepts v. 
Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983); Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 139 
(Utah 1976). 
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(Utah 1998).3 See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, f 57, 993 P.2d 191, 205. The Court 
applies this standard because "[tjrial courts are usually given broad discretion in 
controlling the conduct of attorneys in matters before the court." Margulies v. Upchurchu 
696P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
Despite the foregoing authorities, plaintiffs ask the Court to apply a de novo 
standard of review across the board in this case. The cases they cite in support of this 
standard are factually and procedurally inapposite,4 or completely inapplicable.5 The 
standard advocated by plaintiffs would hamstring the district court's ability to craft 
equitable remedies and to manage this case. The extent to which the Order involved 
mixed factual and legal questions may affect the breadth of the district court's discretion, 
but not the abuse of discretion standard itself. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 
(Utah 1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this 
appeal: 
Rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 507, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 1.6, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Such discretion is limited to the extent it invokes this Court's interest in administering 
ethical rules. See Houghton, 962 P.2d at 61. Yet, when disqualification involves factual 
disputes and "less-tangible" factors, "a trial court is naturally in a better position to 
consider and weigh . . . their application to the legal standard at issue." Id The district 
court faced factual disputes and considered intangible factors and this Court should grant 
the district court discretion reflecting the court's unique position to weigh such factors. 
4
 See Debrv v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, 999 P.2d 582. 
5
 See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); State v. Robinson, 932 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1997). Even under the standard advanced by appellants, "this court will uphold a 
district court's ruling of law on any ground made available to the court below, whether 
expressly relied upon or not." Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74, \ 5, 984 P.2d 980, 982. 
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Preamble, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) 
The complete text of these statutes and rules are attached, respectively, as tabs A-F of 
Addendum 2 hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
In this case, Richard Spratley and Brett Pearce, former in-house lawyers for State 
Farm, sued State Farm and some of its claims department personnel for damages relating 
to the termination of their employment. Early in the action, it became apparent that 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce had taken copies of documents and computer files with them 
when they left State Farm, and that many of these documents and files contained 
information that State Farm views as confidential and/or privileged. The documents and 
files were also covered by a confidentiality agreement signed by both Spratley and 
Pearce. Messrs. Spratley and Pearce made it clear that they intended to use these 
documents and files in prosecuting their case against State Farm and the other defendants 
without regard to their written confidentiality agreement and without regard to the 
confidential or privileged character of the information. 
Because Spratley and Pearce are already in possession of information that would 
normally be obtainable by a plaintiff, if at all, only after a showing of discoverability and 
a determination that they were not privileged, State Farm and the other defendants were 
faced with a situation that turned the usual discovery mechanisms on their head. State 
Farm, as a defendant, was forced to assume a proactive role if it was to protect its 
confidential and privileged information from public disclosure and from misuse by the 
plaintiffs. Accordingly, State Farm filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a 
protective order to obtain the return of the documents and files, and to establish ground 
rules for determining privilege and confidentiality questions before Spratley and Pearce 
could disclose information that they had in their possession. In its motion papers, State 
220719.8 4 
Farm contended that Spratley and Pearce's possession and/or use of this information 
contravened both a nondisclosure agreement they had signed and their professional 
obligations as former counsel for State Farm and its insureds. 
State Farm also moved to disqualify the Christensen & Jensen law firm as counsel 
for Spratley and Pearce. The basis for this motion was that Spratley and Pearce had 
already disclosed confidential and/or privileged information to their counsel, and that 
they likely would disclose further information. Christensen & Jensen has a number of 
other related matters pending against State Farm to which this information would be 
pertinent. To prevent further tainting of the firm with wrongfully obtained confidential 
and /or privileged information, State Farm argued that the firm should be disqualified 
from representing Spratley and Pearce. 
The district court entered an Order granting State Farm's motion for preliminary 
injunction and protective order, and its motion to disqualify counsel. These orders are 
before this court on an interlocutory appeal. 
Although plaintiffs' brief before this court expends much of its energy on issues 
pertinent to the merits of the case, this is not an appeal from a ruling on the merits of 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce's claims against State Farm and the other defendants. 
Except for preliminary rulings required by Rule 65 A to be made in support of the grant of 
a preliminary injunction6, the district court did not address the merits of the case, nor did 
it decide whether specific files or documents are or are not privileged. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The statement of facts appearing in Messrs. Spratley and Pearce's brief consists, 
for the most part, of unproven contentions drawn from their affidavits filed in the district 
court, and selective quotations from some of the many State Farm documents that they 
6
 Rule 65A(e) requires a showing that "[tjhere is a substantial likelihood that the 
applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious 
issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation." 
220719.8 5 
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took with them when they left State Farm's employment. State Farm denies the 
plaintiffs' contentions on the merits. These contentions, however, do not bear on the 
issues before the court, which are limited to whether the district court abused its 
discretion in entering a preliminary injunction, protective order, and disqualification 
order. 
In support of the motions that led to the district court's Order, State Farm 
presented a series of affidavits that focused on State Farm's entitlement to preliminary 
relief, to a protective order, and to the disqualification of appellants' counsel. Messrs. 
Spratley and Pearce presented no evidence refuting the material statements in these 
affidavits. Because little discovery has been taken, and because the standard of review is 
abuse of discretion, it is appropriate to consider the facts in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's ruling. See Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820-21 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Therefore, the following facts are taken from the pleadings and from the 
affidavits filed by State Farm. 
1. Spratley and Pearce Js relationship with State Farm 
Richard Spratley and Brett Pearce acted as in-house attorneys for State Farm for 
more than a decade. (R. 3). Mr. Spratley came to work for State Farm in 1987 as "house 
counsel" for the company's Utah office. In January 1991, he became managing attorney 
for State Farm's Claims Litigation Counsel ("CLC") office in Salt Lake City. In that 
capacity, he practiced law and managed other State Farm in-house attorneys. Mr. Pearce 
came to work as a State Farm attorney in the CLC office in 1990. (R. 665-66). In June 
2000, both Mr. Spratley and Mr. Pearce resigned from State Farm and went into private 
practice. (R. 4). In their new roles, they portray themselves as offering a unique 
n 
State Farm and other defendants have not had the opportunity to conduct discovery on 
appellants' contentions. Defendants have not even been able to obtain copies of the 
documents that appellants took from State Farm, despite their having been ordered to turn 
them over. 
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perspective on State Farm to whose wishing to assert claims against State Farm. (R. 
264). 
Both Mr. Spratley and Mr. Pearce were, as they allege in their Complaint, "hired 
[by State Farm] to provide legal services for State Farm and State Farm insureds." (R. 3). 
Like all other lawyers employed by State Farm's CLC office, they represented State Farm 
itself in litigation and arbitration proceedings brought directly against the company. 
They also represented State Farm policyholders in litigation brought by third parties, 
pursuant to policy provisions that entitle State Farm to select counsel and direct the 
litigation of covered claims. (R. 1397-98). In both capacities—as counsel for the 
company and as counsel for its policyholders—Mr. Spratley and Mr. Pearce 
communicated regularly with the individual defendants in this case and other State Farm 
claims department personnel to provide advice about coverage issues, litigation strategy, 
discovery, trial preparation, and settlement. (R. 666). 
At all relevant times, the State Farm claims department considered its relationship 
with Messrs. Spratley and Pearce (like all CLC lawyers) to be a confidential attorney-
client relationship. (R. 641). The claims department personnel who regularly conferred 
with these lawyers about claims handling practices, litigation strategy, coverage issues, 
and settlement issues believed their communications were confidential. (Id.). Claims 
personnel do not disclose such communications outside State Farm and only disclose 
them to parties within State Farm who are involved in the cases for which the attorneys 
were providing advice. (Id.). 
2. Spratley and Pearce's agreement to protect confidentiality 
Like all other employees in the Salt Lake City CLC office, Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce expressly agreed to keep confidential the non-public information they obtained as 
a result of their employment. Specifically, State Farm's Code of Conduct required CLC 
employees to keep all non-public information related to State Farm and its insureds 
strictly confidential and to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure or use. 
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The Code of Conduct further provided that "[t]o protect confidentiality and to preserve 
applicable legal privileges, the discussion of State Farm's legal matters should be 
restricted to those with a need to know." (R. 665, 668, 670-72). Both Mr. Spratley and 
Mr. Pearce agreed to comply with the Code of Conduct and affirmed their intent to 
comply in the future. Each year, they stated in writing whether they had violated the 
Code, and affirmed that they would comply with it in the future. (R. 665). As the 
managing attorney of the Salt Lake City CLC office, Mr. Spratley was responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the Code of Conduct. (Id.) 
3. Spratley and Pearce's resignation from State Farm 
While Mr. Spratley was the managing attorney for its Salt Lake City CLC office, 
State Farm repeatedly expressed concerns to him about his diligence as an attorney and 
about problems related to his management of the office. (R. 89). In January 2000, Mr. 
Spratley stepped down as the manager of the CLC office, but remained an attorney 
employed with the office. (R. 1730). Mr. Pearce applied for Mr. Spratley's former 
position. (R. 1488-89). In June 2000, when Mr. Pearce was not promoted to replace Mr. 
Spratley, both resigned from State Farm. (R. 4). On January 11, 2001, almost six months 
before Spratley and Pearce commenced this case, State Farm's attorney sent them a letter 
reminding them of their obligations not to disclose privileged communications derived 
from their employment with State Farm. (R. 150). 
4. Spratley and Pearce's disclosure of confidential information 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce are now in possession of State Farm documents and 
computer files that they took with them, a number of which are confidential and/or 
privileged. They have refused so far to return the documents and files, and they have 
been unwilling to disclose how many or which documents and files they took. In taking 
these records with them, Spratley and Pearce were clearly undaunted by the fact that they 
were acting in violation of their express written agreements with State Farm. 
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The documents and computer files taken and disclosed to date relate to the legal 
services Mr. Spratley, Mr. Pearce, and other State Farm lawyers provided to State Farm 
and its policyholders. (R. 24-53, 347; 1456-91; 1657-1740). These materials were 
apparently taken to assist Spratley and Pearce in prosecuting this case and in starting a 
private practice oriented to claims against State Farm. Shortly after they left State Farm, 
their new firm announced their practice in a promotional internet website as follows: 
From the "If you can't beat them, join them" department: 
Richard Spratley and Brett Pearce have for more than a 
decade been the top two in-house attorneys for State Farm 
Insurance in Utah. These two excellent attorneys got fed up 
with State Farm and now want to represent individual 
accident victims with claims against their former employer. . . 
. We are pleased to welcome them into the fold, as they 
crossover from the legions at State Farm. We look forward to 
utilizing their keen and fresh insights into the inner workings 
of State Farm. 
(R. 264). 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce have made it clear that they intend to base their 
prosecution of this case on confidential information obtained in their capacity as State 
Farm lawyers, without regard either to their express agreement to maintain the 
confidentiality of information gained while employees of State Farm or to the obligations 
of confidentiality that arose by reason of their legal representation of State Farm and its 
insureds. They have already filed with the court some of the confidential materials they 
took with them. (R. 51, 347). These documents not only discuss specific cases involving 
State Farm and individually named policyholders, but also disclose the content of 
confidential communications between lawyer and client. For example: 
Campbell Memoranda—Mr. Spratley advised State Farm in its defense of 
Campbell v. State Farm, 2001 UT 89, cert, granted, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002). 
Intermittently over a period of about eight years, he consulted with other in-house 
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lawyers, outside counsel and witnesses involved in the case. Although Mr. Spratley did 
not enter an appearance in the case, State Farm's Director of Legal Services asked Mr. 
Spratley in 1988 to review the Campbell file and provide his evaluation. After reviewing 
the file, Mr. Spratley provided State Farm with a confidential written case evaluation. (R. 
657). In 1994, Mr. Spratley prepared another confidential memorandum to State Farm 
providing advice relating to the Campbell case. (R. 661-62). In 1996, Mr. Spratley 
assisted a State Farm employee in preparation for a deposition and hearing in the 
Campbell case. (R. 645). Throughout this period, Mr. Spratley was frequently provided 
with copies of confidential internal memoranda in the case. (R. 657). The plaintiffs in 
Campbell are represented by Christensen & Jensen—the same lawyers who now 
represent Spratley and Pearce in this case. Mr. Spratley has now disclosed information 
relating to both of the memoranda he prepared for State Farm. (R. 690: Second Spratley 
Aff, 113 & Exh. 4). State Farm does not know what other Campbell materials Mr. 
Spratley has in his possession or may have disclosed to his counsel. 
Partington Correspondence—On September 7, 1994, Mr. Spratley met with State 
Farm Divisional Claim Superintendent Brad Partington to discuss certain issues relating 
to discovery, trial, and the use of experts in litigation for both State Farm and its 
policyholders. When Mr. Partington memorialized their confidential meeting in two 
letters, he believed that the letters would be held in confidence. (R. 635-36). Mr. 
Spratley, however, took copies of the letters with him when he left State Farm and 
annexed them as exhibits to an affidavit he filed in this case. (R. 347). 
Pearce/Kotter Correspondence—On February 16, 1999, Mr. Pearce conferred 
with State Farm's Michael Arnold and Scott Kotter concerning his settlement authority in 
a specific case that Mr. Pearce was handling for a State Farm insured. Mr. Pearce then 
wrote Mr. Kotter confirming the substance of the telephone conversation. Both Mr. 
Kotter and Mr. Arnold believed that the conversation and the letter were privileged and 
confidential. (R. 644, 651-52). Mr. Pearce, however, took a copy of the letter when he 
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resigned from State Farm and annexed it as an exhibit to an affidavit he filed in this case. 
(R.347). 
Arnold/Kingman Memorandum—In September 1999, State Farm's claims 
managers Mike Arnold and Craig Kingman met with Spratley, Pearce and other CLC 
lawyers to discuss litigation handled by the CLC office. The claims managers assumed 
that their discussions would be held in strict confidence and thus spoke frankly about 
problems they perceived in the handling of State Farm cases and about general litigation 
strategy. (R. 643). Mr. Arnold and Mr. Kingman issued an internal memorandum 
summarizing the meeting for the benefit of those present. They believed this 
memorandum would be held in confidence. (R. 643). Spratley and Pearce, however, 
took the memorandum with them when they left State Farm and annexed a copy of it as 
Exhibit 5 to their Complaint. (R. 51). 
These are only examples. For about a decade State Farm claims personnel 
regularly met with Messrs. Spratley and Pearce about litigation they were handling for 
both State Farm and its policyholders. State Farm believed that their meetings and 
written communications with these lawyers were protected by the attorney-client 
privilege and by their written confidentiality agreements. Yet Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce advised the district court that they intend to make these communications the 
centerpiece of this case. Thus they have filed affidavits making allegations that either 
directly disclose privileged communications, or refer to such communications in a 
manner that will necessitate eventual disclosure to prove the allegations. Mr. Spratley 
and Mr. Pearce intend to disclose communications concerning decisions State Farm made 
to settle or litigate particular cases (R. 347: Spratley Aff. t t 7(h), 7(j) & 7(1); Pearce Aff. 
t t 10(b), 10(d) & 10(f)); to assert particular defenses in particular cases (R. 347: 
Spratley Aff. f 7(c); Pearce Aff. f 10(e)); to retain particular experts in litigation (R. 347: 
Spratley Aff. f 7(d); Pearce Aff. f 10(h)); to file offers of judgment in particular cases (R. 
347: Spratley Aff. f 7(f)); to conduct discovery in particular cases (R. 347: Spratley Aff. 
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Tf 7(g)). Also to be disclosed are communications regarding discussions between State 
Farm and its lawyers concerning the evaluation of the merits of particular cases (R. 347: 
Spratley Aff f 7(h); Pearce Aff fflf 10(d) & 10(f)). 
5. Christensen & Jensen's representation of parties adverse to State Farm 
The defendants' sought disqualification of the law firm of Christensen & Jensen, 
and the district court ordered it, because this firm now has access to an unknown, but 
obviously large body of confidential and /or privileged State Farm information pertinent 
to this and other cases it is prosecuting against State Farm. Each of the firm's other cases 
against State Farm challenge the alleged litigation and claims handling practices about 
which Messrs. Spratley and Pearce have already disclosed privileged information in this 
case. Specifically: 
a. The Campbell case 
Over the course of eight years, Mr. Spratley advised State Farm regarding legal 
issues arising in Campbell v. State Farm, pending before the United States Supreme 
Court on appeal from this Court on a grant of certiorari from this Court. As described 
above, Mr. Spratley received confidential communications concerning the case, and he 
provided advice on the case to his superiors and others in State Farm. In an article 
appearing in the Deseret News on June 20, 2001, Mr. Humpherys was quoted as saying 
the following about the present case: "There are correlations and overlaps with the 
Campbell case, and there's no question there is some relationship and similarities in the 
evidence." (R. 351-52). Spratley and Pearce assert that their claims are based on an 
alleged "pervasive scheme" at issue in the Campbell case, and they have submitted a 
copy of an order from the Campbell case in support of this assertion. (R. 94, 114). Mr. 
Spratley also draws comparisons to the Campbell case in an affidavit he filed in this case. 
(R.347: Spratley Affidavit, t 9(c)). 
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b. The Mosier case 
In Mosier ex rel Lone Tree Services, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, Case No. 99091180 (Third Jud. Dist. Ct., filed November 23, 1999), 
Christensen & Jensen represents the bankruptcy trustee of a State Farm insured in a bad 
faith claim against State Farm. (R. 354). The trustee alleges, among other things, that 
State Farm unreasonably delayed in acting on the debtor's claims, unreasonably 
investigated the claims, unreasonably refused to settle them, and unreasonably denied 
coverage. (R. 356-64). The court in Mosier ordered that discovery be bifurcated 
between the issues (1) whether the State Farm policy covered the claims, and, if so, (2) 
whether State Farm acted in bad faith in denying the claim. State Farm is currently 
pursuing an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's finding of coverage. Plaintiffs 
claims involve the types of issues—if not exactly the same issues—on which Mr. 
Spratley and Mr. Pearce regularly advised State Farm during their employment. 
c. The Fidel case 
In Melia Fidel v. Tiffany K. Maughan and State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, Case No. 990910933 (Third Jud. Dist. Ct., filed October 29, 1999), 
Christensen & Jensen represents a plaintiff challenging State Farm's claims handling and 
litigation practices (R. 368-76), including State Farm's practices relating to coverage of 
verdicts in excess of policy limits. (R. 429, 452-53). She challenges the conduct of a 
particular State Farm agent—defendant Scott Kotter in this case—with whom both Mr. 
Spratley and Mr. Pearce had confidential communications over much of their careers at 
State Farm. (R. 380, 383, 429). Plaintiff also contends that one of the physicians 
retained by State Farm to examine her was not independent. This is one of the same 
physicians about whom Mr. Spratley has already made disclosures in paragraph 7(d) of 
his affidavit in this case. 
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d. The Green case 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Lora Green et al.. Case 
No. 96-0400447 (Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., filed July 1, 1996), Utah S. Ct. Case No. 
20010316, Christensen & Jensen represents a State Farm policyholder in a dispute with 
State Farm over underinsured motorist benefits. Christensen & Jensen has asserted that 
State Farm's claims employees failed adequately to investigate Ms. Green's underinsured 
motorist claim and unreasonably delayed or refused to consent to a settlement. (R. 464, 
468, 490-91). Christensen & Jensen has specifically challenged the conduct of Mike 
Arnold—a defendant.in this case—with whom Messrs. Spratley and Pearce routinely 
conferred for years. Christensen & Jensen's attempted discovery of State Farm claims 
personnel and lawyers prompted State Farm to seek a protective order preventing 
discovery regarding State Farm's litigation strategy—including practices challenged in 
this case—and internal claims communications. (R. 526, 528-29). The court deferred 
such discovery pending resolution of underlying contractual issues. Following cross-
motions for summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment in State Farm's 
favor, ruling that the terms of the policy prevented plaintiff from recovering underinsured 
motorist benefits. (R. 332). Christensen & Jensen has appealed the ruling to this Court. 
e. The Williams case 
At the time the district court entered the Order in the present case, Christensen & 
Jensen represented the plaintiff in Anna Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., Case No. 998902955 (Third Jud. Dist. Ct., filed September 3, 1999), a 
claim against State Farm for unpaid personal injury protection benefits. The plaintiff 
challenges the credibility and independence of the physician on whose opinion State 
Farm relied in denying personal injury protection benefits. After unsuccessfully asserting 
her claim against State Farm in small claims court, the plaintiff filed an appeal in Third 
District Court. (R. 548-55). As in Williams, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce in the present 
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case challenge State Farm's use of particular medical experts. This is a topic on which 
both appellants conferred frequently with State Farm during their employment. 
C. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
After leaving State Farm with confidential and privileged materials, and after 
announcing that they had set themselves up in law practice to represent persons with 
claims against State Farm, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce filed their Complaint in this case 
on May 31, 2002. From the inception of this action, it was clear to all parties that the 
propriety of the plaintiffs' possession, use, and disclosure of non-public information 
obtained while employed by State Farm is a central issue. It was also clear to all parties 
that plaintiffs' possession of this information turned the normal discovery process, and 
the normal privilege determination process applicable to discovery requests, on their 
heads. Plaintiffs had obtained protected material that they would otherwise have been 
required to discover only in accordance with the rules; defendants had no opportunity to 
object to its production or obtain a determination of its confidential or privileged status 
before it was disclosed to or by the plaintiffs. 
On August 10, 2001, counsel for the parties held a planning conference pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), during which counsel for Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce stipulated: 
Issues surrounding the confidentiality and privilege to be 
accorded to evidence which may support either the claims or 
defenses in this case are particularly problematic in light of 
the facts that (a) during the entire period of their employment 
for defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, both plaintiffs acted as attorneys for State Farm, 
and (b) plaintiffs' case involves communications with State 
Farm concerning plaintiffs' handling of litigation for State 
Farm and its policyholders. 
(R. 187-88). In the same stipulated Rule 26(f) Planning Conference Scheduling Order, 
"[t]he parties agreed that it is essential to obtain the direction of the Court addressing 
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these issues before initial disclosures and commencement of discovery." (R. 188). After 
making these stipulations, defendants propounded minimal written discovery, but did not 
take any depositions or other discovery. Plaintiffs propounded no discovery at all. 
In an effort to correct the problems created by plaintiffs' removal and disclosure 
State Farm's documents, State Farm filed a motion for preliminary injunction and 
protective order, pursuant to Rules 65 A and 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State 
Farm asked the court to establish ground rules to assist the parties in resolving the 
confidentiality and privilege issues identified by the parties' proposed Rule 26(f) 
Planning Conference Scheduling Order. (R. 230). In as much as Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce contended that they had no obligation to protect what State Farm contended was 
confidential or privileged information, State Farm's motion sought an order that would 
prospectively prevent them from violating the attorney-client privilege and their duties 
under Rule 1.6, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The motion also sought an order 
requiring Spratley and Pearce to return the confidential documents they took from State 
Farm in violation of their written agreement. The motion was supported by six affidavits 
of State Farm employees. (R. 633-674). In opposition, Spratley and Pearce submitted 
their own affidavits which dealt summarily with attorney-client issues, asserting that 
much of their activity at State Farm was administrative. They also made assertions 
relevant to the merits of their claims against the defendants. Neither plaintiff denied, 
however, that he provided legal services to both State Farm and its insureds. (R. 690). 
State Farm also filed a motion to disqualify Christensen & Jensen. (R. 317-19). 
State Farm supported its disqualification motion with filings from other cases in which 
Christensen & Jensen represents parties adverse to State Farm, demonstrating that the 
issues in those cases were closely related to issues about which Spratley and Pearce had 
confidential information. (R. 348-629). 
8
 Although the parties stipulated to the terms of the proposed Scheduling Order, it was 
never signed by the district court. 
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On December 7, 2001, after oral argument, the district court entered an order (the 
"Order") in the form of a minute entry granting both motions. (R. 2557-60). Regarding 
State Farm's motion for preliminary injunction and protective order, the Order concluded 
that State Farm had grounds to object to the disclosure of communications between it and 
plaintiffs, both with respect to their direct representation of State Farm and with respect 
to their representation of State Farm's insureds. It noted that "after reviewing the 
relevant case law, it is clear the majority of jurisdictions hold an attorney hired by an 
insurance company to defend its insured represents the insurer, absent any conflict of 
interest, in something akin to a 'dual client status.'" (R. 2558). The court then ruled that, 
"[w]hile neither side disputes that the primary duty, when an attorney is hired to provide 
defense under an insurance policy, is to the insured, the Court finds, and the case law 
supports, that such does not necessarily limit the ability of the insurer to assert attorney-
client privilege." (Id.). 
Based on these principles, the district court ordered Messrs. Spratley and Pearce 
to: 
1. Refrain from disclosing (in this litigation or otherwise) confidential 
communications and information exchanged between Spratley or Pearce on 
the one hand, and State Farm and/or its insureds on the other hand, relating 
to the provision of legal services by Spratley, Pearce or other lawyers for 
State Farm, or made for the purpose of facilitating such services; 
2. Refrain from disclosing any facts relating to Spratley or Pearce's 
representation of State Farm's insureds, absent express consent to 
disclosure by the insureds; and 
3. Return to State Farm all confidential documents materials, and information 
that Spratley and Pearce created, maintained or acquired as part of their 
employment with State Farm, and that are currently in their possession. 
(14). 
In deciding to disqualify Christensen & Jensen, the district court adhered to the 
test established in Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1081 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1991). (R. 2559). The court held that Spratley and Pearce obtained State Farm's 
confidential and privileged litigation strategies and necessarily divulged this information 
to Christensen & Jensen, and that continued disclosures of such information threatened to 
taint all further proceedings in this case. (R. 2559). Hence, the court ruled, "[w]hile 
motions to disqualify are to be viewed with extreme caution, because privileged 
communications are the centerpiece of this case, the Court is of the opinion that 
disqualification, as requested by defendants, is appropriate." (Id.). 
After the district court entered the December 7 Order, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce 
petitioned this court for interlocutory review. Their petition essentially ignored the 
preliminary nature of the district court's Order and the fact that the district court had not 
actually addressed the confidential and/or privileged character of specific documents. 
Instead, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce shifted their attention to the merits of the case. To 
that end, they stated that "[i]f the challenged materials are not confidential and privileged, 
then petitioners can proceed to prove their case. If the challenged materials are 
determined to be otherwise, then petitioners would be unable to proceed and the matter 
would be resolved." (R. 2670). Based on this concession regarding the merits of the 
case, State Farm and the other defendants moved the district court for summary judgment 
on Spratley and Pearce's claims. (R. 2654-55). This court stayed proceedings in the 
district court before briefing was complete on State Farm's summary judgment motion. 
The motion for summary judgment is not before this court on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The injunctive portions of the district court's Order were designed to correct the 
problems stemming from Spratley and Pearce's removal of confidential and privileged 
State Farm documents in violation of an express confidentiality agreement, and then 
disclosing them in a suit against State Farm. The district court's injunction was also 
designed to address Spratley and Pearce's claim that they had no duty to keep any of the 
documents they removed confidential, no duty to respect the confidentiality of other 
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communications with State Farm, no duty to refrain from public discussion of facts 
relating to their representation of State Farm's policyholders over a decade, and no duty 
to return the documents and files taken in violation of their express agreement. The 
Order directed the return of the documents and files to State Farm and gave the parties 
prospective guidelines to assist them in sorting out particular confidentiality and privilege 
issues as the case moves forward. While State Farm supported its request for the Order 
with references to privileged documents disclosed by Spratley and Pearce, the Order did 
not determine that any particular document was or was not privileged. In toto, this 
portion of the Order responded to the parties' stipulation that "it is essential to obtain the 
direction of the Court" on privilege and related issues before commencement of 
discovery. 
In their opening brief to this court, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce contend that their 
confidential communications with State Farm are not protected from disclosure because 
they did not have an attorney-client relationship with State Farm and owed it no other 
duty of confidentiality. This argument fails for at least three reasons. First, much of their 
legal work over the decade of their employment was undertaken directly for State Farm 
in connection with the settlement of claims by minor persons, no-fault PIP arbitrations, 
uninsured motorist claims, and the like. There can be no question about the applicability 
of the attorney-client privilege to communications involved in this work. 
Second, as to legal work undertaken at State Farm's direction for policyholders, 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce still owed a duty of confidentiality to State Farm, whether or 
not this court concludes that Spratley and Pearce had both State Farm and its insureds as 
clients, or only the insureds. The vast majority of courts that have considered the 
question have held that insurance defense lawyers represent—and owe duties of 
confidentiality to—both the policyholder and the insurer. Regardless of the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship between lawyer and insurer, the lawyer still owes a duty of 
confidentiality to the insurer as to confidential communications that facilitate the 
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representation of policyholders. In either event, the district court correctly concluded that 
Spratley and Pearce owed a duty of confidentiality to State Farm. 
Third, and independent of the attorney-client privilege, Rule 1.6, Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct, prohibits Messrs. Spratley and Pearce from disclosing facts 
relating to their representation of policyholders without policyholder consent. Messrs. 
Spratley and Pearce have already disclosed sensitive details of their representation of 
policyholders—without consent—and they have threatened to do so in the future as an 
integral part of their case against State Farm. The plaintiffs' brief does not seriously deal 
with this issue. 
Spratley and Pearce also argue that, for a number of reasons, they are exempt from 
the normal duties of lawyer confidentiality. These arguments are all without merit. Rule 
1.6(b)(3), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which allows lawyers to reveal 
information necessary to establish a claim or defense against a client, does not affect the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege. Rule 504(d)(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, which is 
the "breach of duty" exception to the privilege, has been narrowly interpreted by the 
courts to permit disclosure of privileged communications only in suits by lawyers to 
collect unpaid fees. Rule 504(d)(1), the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, does not 
apply here because plaintiffs failed to establish a crime or fraud, and have not even 
attempted to comply with the rule: rather than establishing the predicates for the 
exception by independent evidence and then submitting the privileged material to the 
district court for in camera evaluation, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce simply attached 
privileged communications to their Complaint and affidavits and then filed them. Most 
importantly, the crime-fraud exception needs to be considered on a document-by-
document basis, not as a wholesale excuse for disclosing all of appellants' confidential 
communications over a decade. Finally, State Farm has not waived the protection of the 
privilege as to confidential communications with its lawyers; it has certainly not done so, 
as plaintiffs claim, by publishing general statements about the Claims Litigation Counsel 
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program. If Messrs. Spratley and Pearce believe that State Farm has waived the privilege 
as to a particular document, nothing in the Order prevents them from raising the issue in 
the appropriate way. 
The Order was a proper exercise of the district court's discretion to enter a 
preliminary injunction under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) and a protection order 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The district court correctly ordered plaintiffs 
to refrain from disclosing confidential information relating to representation of State 
Farm and its insureds. The threatened violation of a lawyer's duty to refrain from using 
client confidences has been recognized as the basis for injunctive relief for at least a 
century. Indeed, authorities from around the country have repeatedly affirmed 
injunctions virtually identical to the Order in this case. State Farm and the other 
defendants are therefore likely to prevail on the merits. Further, since the confidential 
nature of lawyer-client communications is permanently impaired by disclosure, State 
Farm faced irreparable injury unless the injunction issued. The only "harm" Messrs. 
Spratley and Pearce faced was that they would be enjoined from using information they 
had no right to use in the first place. The district court therefore did not abuse its 
discretion in preventing Messrs. Spratley and Pearce from disclosing privileged 
information. 
The Order also appropriately required Spratley and Pearce to return to State Farm 
all confidential documents and files in their possession as a means of restoring the status 
quo before the material was taken. The documents and files were taken in direct 
violation of a written confidentiality agreement. 
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion in disqualifying 
Christensen & Jensen as counsel for Messrs. Spratley and Pearce. Without the Order, 
Christensen & Jensen would have had ready access to State Farm's confidential and 
privileged communications for use in this and other cases involving issues about which 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce have knowledge, all without having to demonstrate that the 
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information is discoverable. Their filings in this case disclosed privileged information 
bearing directly on issues in other cases in which Christensen & Jensen appears as 
counsel against State Farm. Unless they are disqualified, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce 
will inevitably continue to disclose privileged communications because they are integral 
to their prosecution of the case. Christensen & Jensen's continued representation of the 
appellants in this case therefore threatened to taint all further proceedings, justifying the 
disqualification order. 
The Court should affirm the Order in all respects. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ISSUED A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER TO ESTABLISH GROUND 
RULES FOR DISCOVERY AND TRIAL IN THIS UNUSUAL CASE 
Plaintiffs' principal arguments against the Order are that it is vague, that it is 
premature, and that it misplaced the burdens normally associated with establishing the 
protections of the attorney-client privilege. They argue that the district court's Order was 
too general because applicability of the privilege must be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis, with the proponent of the privilege having the burden of proof. See App. Br. at 36-
37. These arguments, however, ignore the fundamental purpose of the Order—to correct 
the upside down situation created when plaintiffs wrongfully removed confidential and 
privileged materials from State Farm and then used them in mounting their suit. The 
Order was not intended to determine whether any particular document or communication 
was or was not privileged. It was intended, rather, to establish prospective guidelines 
necessitated by the unique circumstances of this case, circumstances created by Spratley 
and Pearce. The most important of those circumstances were the following: 
First, Mr. Spratley and Mr. Pearce secretly removed confidential computer files 
and documents from State Farm's offices when they left their employment in violation of 
repeated written promises to State Farm. They intended to use them—as State Farm 
viewed it—in violation of their duties to State Farm and its policyholders under the 
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attorney-client privilege and Rule 1.6. To this day, State Farm does not know what 
documents Spratley and Pearce took, except as Spratley and Pearce have chosen to 
release them piecemeal in this case. When State Farm asked for the return of the 
documents and then for their production as part of discovery, Spratley and Pearce refused 
to produce them. When the district court ordered them to be produced, Spratley and 
Pearce still refused to produce them. 
Second, in their affidavits, Mr. Spratley and Mr. Pearce made plain their intention 
to base their case on the confidential documents they removed and on other client 
communications. The confidential records Spratley and Pearce took from State Farm are 
not just going to be an incidental part of the case; rather, they intend to make this a high-
profile showcase for their access to confidential communications with State Farm, its 
claims personnel, and its lawyers. 
Third and most importantly, Mr. Spratley and Mr. Pearce made it clear that they 
believe they have no duty to keep any of the documents they removed confidential. They 
and their attorneys profess to believe that they are completely unrestrained by the 
attorney-client privilege, by their specific written agreements to keep State Farm records 
confidential, or by Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Spratley, Pearce, 
and their lawyers advanced the position that these limitations simply did not apply to 
them in their dealings with State Farm over the previous decade. 
As a result of the foregoing, State Farm faced a dilemma. If it proceeded to 
defend the case without first attempting to correct the unfairness created by plaintiffs' 
having taken State Farm's confidential records, it would be required publicly to discuss 
documents and communications it assumed were privileged and confidential, and to do so 
in the presence of Spratley and Pearce's retained counsel, who concurrently represented 
other plaintiffs in cases against State Farm on related issues. In short, State Farm was 
presented with the choice either to protect its privilege or defend the case. 
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This dilemma is exemplified by the plaintiffs' attachment to their Complaint of a 
State Farm document that is clearly marked "Privileged and Confidential." (R. 1089). 
In a normal case, appellants would have requested such documents under Utah R. Civ. P. 
34. State Farm would then object to the production under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 
which permits discovery of "any matter, not privileged." Spratley and Pearce would 
obtain a privilege log from State Farm, detailing the document's nature, and use this 
information to challenge the protectability of this document in a motion to compel under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37. State Farm would then have the initial burden of showing the 
applicability of the privilege, and Spratley and Pearce would have the burden of proving 
any exceptions to the privilege. The trial court would then decide whether the document 
should be produced. In the present case, however, there was no opportunity to follow 
these procedures because they had been trumped by Spratley and Pearce's wrongful 
removal of the document from State Farm's files and its filing in open court. 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce no longer seem to acknowledge the severity of the 
problem they created by taking the documents and using them at will. At the outset of 
the case, however, both sides agreed that ground rules on privilege and confidentiality 
issues were needed before discovery could proceed. Thus, in their proposed Rule 26(f) 
Planning Conference Scheduling Order, the parties stipulated that issues of 
confidentiality and privilege "are particularly problematic" and that "it is essential to 
obtain the direction of the Court addressing these issues before initial disclosures and 
commencement of discovery." (R. 188). 
Pursuant to this stipulation, State Farm moved for a preliminary injunction and a 
protective order. To demonstrate the need for ground rules, State Farm used particular 
documents attached to the Complaint as examples of privileged materials taken by 
plaintiffs and then made public. However, it did not ask for a detailed determination as to 
the privileged character of all the documents made public. State Farm was unable to 
move as to many of the particular documents for which it sought protection because 
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State Farm did not know—and still does not know—which documents and computer files 
were removed by Spratley and Pearce, with the exception of the documents attached to 
plaintiffs' Complaint and affidavits. In response, the district court issued an Order that 
was both prospective and general because the circumstances required such an order. 
Spratley and Pearce claim that State Farm failed to meet its burden in proving that 
specific documents are privileged. This is a red herring for at least two reasons. First, 
State Farm does not know what documents and communications plaintiffs possess, much 
less which ones they plan to make public. Second, the problem is not that Spratley and 
Pearce threatened to disclose a particular document. The problem is that they intend to 
disclose many of documents and oral communications with State Farm and its 
policyholders, all without regard for any duties of confidentiality that bind them. Both 
parties needed the guidance of the court on whether Spratley and Pearce owe duties of 
confidentiality to State Farm and its insureds. If, as we believe, Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce are bound by the normal rules that lawyers must observe and by their express 
confidentiality agreements, then the parties will have a framework within which to debate 
the privileged character of particular documents. The Order establishes such a 
framework. 
Another red herring is the contention that the district court's Order protected 
communications relating to Spratley and Pearce's administrative duties at State Farm's 
CLC office. State Farm does not seek to prevent—and the district court's Order did not 
prohibit—disclosure of communications involving administrative functions. The Order, 
rather, (1) prevented disclosure of confidential communications made to facilitate the 
legal services Messrs. Spratley and Pearce provided to State Farm and its policyholders; 
(2) prevented disclosure of facts relating to their representation of policyholders; and (3) 
directed return of the documents wrongfully taken from its files. Absent the Order, these 
ordinary and proper concerns could not be vindicated by orderly presentation of the 
issues before the district court. Without the Order, Spratley and Pearce would have 
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continued their wholesale disclosure of protected communications, causing irreparable 
harm in their wake. 
II. THE LAW PROHIBITS SPRATLEY AND PEARCE FROM DISCLOSING 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS WITH, AND CONFIDENTIAL 
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING, STATE FARM AND ITS 
POLICYHOLDERS 
The injunctive provisions of the district court's Order were based on the attorney-
client privilege as set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 504, the confidentiality agreement 
between State Farm and plaintiffs, and the duty of lawyers under Utah Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.6 to refrain from disclosing facts relating to the representation of 
a client without the client's consent. Plaintiffs' brief focuses almost exclusively on the 
"dual client" question, Le^ , whether Spratley and Pearce had an attorney-client 
relationship with both State Farm and its insureds in the context of third party claims 
against insureds. Their brief does not seriously address either of the other two grounds 
for the Order's injunctive provisions, Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
and the express confidentiality agreement with State Farm. 
Despite their failure to acknowledge it, plaintiffs frequently represented State 
Farm as a party to litigation and in arbitrations. Confidential communications relating to 
such cases are clearly protected, and plaintiffs cannot seriously contend otherwise. 
Concerning their representations of State Farm policyholders, the district court held—we 
believe correctly—that Messrs. Spratley and Pearce represented both State Farm and the 
policyholders. This court, however, does not need to reach the correctness of this holding 
because the authorities have consistently held that insurance defense counsel owe a duty 
of confidentiality to the insurer, even if it is not labeled a "client." 
As for rule 1.6 and plaintiffs' confidentiality agreement, the district court was well 
within its discretion in finding that plaintiffs' conduct to date, as well as their expressed 
intentions for the future, demonstrate that they have actually violated and intend to 
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continue to violate their duties under the rule and the agreement. The district court's 
award of injunctive relief was entirely appropriate and should be affirmed. 
A. Spratley and Pearce Are Bound By the Attorney-Client Privilege to 
Protect Confidential Communications Relating to Their Direct 
Representation of State Farm 
The attorney-client privilege shields the confidentiality of communications 
between clients and their lawyers. See Utah R. Evid. 504(b); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-
8(2). It protects "communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services." Utah R. Evid. 504(b) (emphasis added). The privilege is 
designed to "encourage candor between attorney and client and promote the best possible 
representation." Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources, 801 P.2d 909, 911 
(Utah 1990). The privilege protects a corporation's communications with inside counsel, 
including "the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and 
informed advice." See id. 504(c); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-91 
(1981). Because the privilege belongs to the client, which the lawyer must safeguard, the 
client is entitled to halt the disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications. 
See Utah R. Evid. 504(b). 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce directly represented State Farm in a number of 
matters, including minor settlements, no-fault PIP arbitrations, and uninsured motorist 
claims. (R. 1394). They also advised State Farm employees on legislative and case law 
developments in insurance coverage issues. (Id.). As their complaint alleges, "[a]s part 
of their employment duties, sometimes [Spratley and Pearce] would directly represent 
State Farm's interests in cases which were in or anticipated to be in litigation." (R. 3). 
Spratley and Pearce themselves note that their claims surround "cases in litigation being 
handled by [Spratley and Pearce] in [sic] behalf of State Farm or State Farm's insureds," 
not just the insureds. (R. 4, 188) (emphasis added). In situations where Spratley and 
Pearce directly represented State Farm, the attorney-client privilege unquestionably 
attaches. 
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Spratley and Pearce have already disclosed privileged communications relating to 
their representation of State Farm, and they have threatened to disclose still others. (R. 
347).9 The Order appropriately enjoined them from violating the privilege in relation to 
their direct representation of State Farm. 
B. Spratley and Pearce Are Bound By the Attorney-Client Privilege to 
Protect Confidential Communications Relating to Their 
Representation of State Farm Policyholders 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce also represented State Farm policyholders under the 
terms of their insurance policies. In entering its Order, the district court followed the rule 
adopted by the majority of the nation's jurisdictions that have considered the question 
and concluded that the attorney-client privilege shields an insurer's confidential 
communications with the attorneys it hires to represent its insureds. Therefore, it held 
that the privilege protects confidential communications between plaintiffs and State Farm 
to facilitate these services. Although State Farm believes that this decision was correct, 
this court need not reach it to affirm the Order insofar as it applies to plaintiffs' 
representation of policyholders. For, as demonstrated in the first part of this Argument 
below, even if the court were to reject the "dual client" doctrine, the law still imposes a 
duty of confidentiality upon Spratley and Pearce. 
1. Duties based on the obligation of confidentiality to insurers 
regardless of their client status 
In the latest version of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the 
American Law Institute notes that regardless of the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship between an insurer and counsel for the insured, the latter still owes a duty of 
confidentiality to the insurer. For example, "communications between the lawyer and 
representatives of the insurer concerning such matters as progress reports, case 
9
 This portion of the record contains Spratley and Pearce's first affidavits. Mr. Spratley 
disclosed communications relating to his direct representation of State Farm in f 7(j) of 
his Affidavit, and Mr. Pearce disclosed the same type of communications in f 10(f) of his 
Affidavit. While these affidavits impermissibly disclose privileged communications, 
State Farm denies the claims in these affidavits. 
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evaluations, and settlement should be regarded as privileged." Restatement (Third) Of 
The Law Governing Lawyers §14, cmt. f. Messrs. Spratley and Pearce routinely 
communicated with State Farm regarding such matters as progress reports, case 
evaluations, and settlement—all of which the Restatement says should be regarded as 
privileged. The Restatement further provides: 
[A] lawyer owes a duty of care . . . to a nonclient when and to 
the extent that: 
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the 
primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer's 
services benefit the nonclient; 
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's 
performance of obligations to the client; and 
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of 
those obligations to the client unlikely. 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 51(3). Under these principles: 
[A] lawyer designated by an insurer to defend an insured 
owes a duty of care to the insurer with respect to matters as to 
which the interests of the insurer and insured are not in 
conflict, whether or not the insurer is held to be a co-client of 
the lawyer. 
Id. at cmt. G (emphasis added). The Restatements recognition of a duty under these 
circumstances is consistent with this court's recent recognition that the "modern trend is 
to abandon or relax the privity requirement recognizing that under certain circumstances 
a lawyer may have a duty to exercise reasonable care to a non-client." Oxendine v. 
Overturf, 973 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1999).10 
Spratley and Pearce knew that State Farm relied on them to provide legal services 
to the insured, their representation of policyholders provided a benefit to State Farm 
because those services fulfilled contractual obligations State Farm owed to the insured. 
10
 Although this Court did not recognize non-client duties in Oxendine due to issues 
under Utah's wrongful death statute, no such issues are present in this case. 
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Moreover, unless Spratley and Pearce owed a duty to State Farm, which supervised their 
work for insureds, it is "unlikely" (in the words of the Restatement) that the duties of 
these lawyers would be otherwise enforced, given the contractual delegation to State 
Farm by the insureds of the supervision of counsel and the conduct of the litigation. 
Thus regardless whether Utah recognizes the "dual client" doctrine (see below), 
Spratley and Pearce nevertheless owed duties of confidentiality to State Farm. Spratley 
and Pearce are not permitted to pick and choose those to whom they owe duties of 
confidentiality, particularly when the only policy justification they offer for being freed 
of all such duties is that it will permit them to benefit financially, as by this suit or by 
selling their confidential knowledge in the marketplace to persons who wish to sue State 
Farm. 
2. Duties based on the tri-partite relationship. 
The district court concluded that when the insured is sued by a third party, there is 
a "dual client" relationship between Spratley and Pearce, on the one hand, and State Farm 
and its insureds, on the other. The "tri-partite" nature of this relationship is well 
established in jurisdictions across the nation. "Counsel retained by an insurer to defend 
its insured has an attorney-client relationship with the insurer," as well as the insured. 
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 79 
Cal.App.4th 114, 127 (2000). "This concept of dual or joint representation has been 
widely acknowledged, and sanctioned by the courts." State v. Second Judicial Dist. 
Court, 783 P.2d 911, 913 (Mont. 1989) (citing cases). Dual representation recognizes 
that, in claims like those handled by Spratley and Pearce for insureds, both the insurer 
and the insured have a "primary, overlapping and common interest [in] the speedy and 
successful resolution of the claim and litigation." American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 38 Cal.App.3d 579, 591 (1974). 
Because the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, and because both the 
insured and the insurer are the attorney's clients, the privilege "clearly encompasses both 
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insured and insurer." Id, at 593-94. Hence, when an insurer engages an attorney to 
defend its insured, the privilege protects communications between (i) the attorney and the 
insured, and (ii) the attorney and the insurer. See id. at 594. 
Of course, "each member of the trio, attorney, client-insured, and client-insurer 
has corresponding rights and obligations founded largely on contract and, as to the 
attorney, by the Rules of Professional Conduct as well." Id. at 591-92. Included among 
these obligations is the attorney's obligation to take remedial measures, including 
withdrawing, if a conflict develops between the insurer and the insured. See Utah R. 
Prof. Conduct, 1.7. Within this framework, insurance defense counsel's primary duty is 
to the insured. However, unless and until an actual conflict arises, the insurance defense 
counsel has two clients: the insured and the insurer. 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce concede that the majority of courts have recognized the 
doctrine of dual representation. But they ask this Court to side with the minority and, in doing 
11
 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 1988) (when insurance company 
retains attorney to defend action against insured, attorney represents insured as well as 
insurer in furthering the interests of each other); Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss 
& Miller, 43 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1995) (insured and insurer are both represented by the 
attorney as long as there is no conflict of inlerest); Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law 
Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 597 (Ariz. 2001) (defense counsel can represent both insurer and 
insured unless there is an actual conflict or the potential for conflict in the particular case 
is great); Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 
322, 329 (111. 1991) ("[W]hen insurer retains attorney to defend insured, attorney 
represents both insured and insurer in furthering the interests of each."); Cincinnati Ins. 
Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1999) (attorney represents both the insured and 
insurer; dual representation permissible even when the attorney was in-house counsel for 
the insurer, because their interests are aligned); Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 
(La. Ct. App. 1968) (an attorney may simultaneously represent the insured and insurer); 
Shahan v. Hilker, 488 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Neb. 1992) ("'[Communication made by an 
insured to his liability insurance company, concerning an event which may be made the 
basis of a claim against him covered by the policy, is a privileged communication, as 
being between attorney and client, if the policy requires the company to defend him 
through its attorney, and communication is intended for the information or assistance of 
the attorney in so defending him.'"); Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412 (Nev. 2000) 
(explaining that a "dual agency" relationship exists between the insured, insurer, and 
attorney, and the insurer has the right to control the litigation); Lieberman v. Employers 
220719 8 3 1 
so, misstate the case law from other jurisdictions. Plaintiffs anchor their position to In re Rules 
of Professional Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing Rules & Procedure, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000). 
As its name indicates, the Rules of Professional Conduct case addressed the propriety of insurer 
billing requirements under the Rules of Professional Conduct, and did not deal with the scope or 
existence of the attorney-client privilege. This case did not alter the principle that, in Montana 
(as in most jurisdictions), insurance defense counsel represents both the insured and the insurer, 
absent a conflict of interest. See State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 783 P.2d 911 (Mont. 
1989). The Montana Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]his concept of dual or joint 
representation has been widely acknowledged, and sanctioned by the courts." Id at 913. Taken 
together the Rules of Professional Conduct case and the Second Judicial District Court case stand 
for the proposition that, absent a conflict of interest, insurance defense attorneys represent both 
insurer and policyholder. See 2 P.3d at 811. See also Jessen v. O'Daniel 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. 
Mont. 1962); Palmer v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 861 P.2d 895 (Mont. 1993); and Safeco 
Ins. Co. v. Ellinghouse, 725 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1986). 
Having misread Montana law, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce advance no other cases 
that squarely address the applicability of attorney-client privilege. Five of their cases12 
stand for nothing more than the general principle that an insurance defense attorney's 
primary duty is to the insured—a principle to which State Farm adheres. Other cases 
they advance concern superfluous legal principles and inapposite facts. For example, in 
Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing attorney has two clients, the 
insured and insurer unless a conflict arises); In re Conduct of O'Neal, 683 P.2d 1352 (Or. 
1984) (referencing dual representation of insurer and insured as example of situations 
where attorney can represent multiple clients if it is obvious the lawyer can represent the 
interests of each client without conflict); Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999) (normally an attorney operates on behalf of two clients, the insurer and the 
insured). 
12
 See Continental Casualty Co. v. Pullman, Comlev, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 
108 (2nd Cir. 1991); Gibbs v. Lappies, 828 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D.N.H. 1993); Dempsev v. 
Associated Aviation Underwriters, 141 F.R.D. 248, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Finlev v. Home 
Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145 (Haw. 1998); Higgins v. Karp, 687 A.2d 539, 543 (Conn. 1997). 
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First American Carriers v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669 (Ark. 1990), two attorneys at the 
same law firm represented opposing parties to the same suit: a former client (through the 
client's insurer) and a current client. The court held that the law firm's continued 
representation of both sides created an appearance of impropriety, and that the firm 
should have disqualified itself. See id. at 671. The court noted in passing that 
policyholders are an insurance defense lawyer's primary client, but gave no further heed 
to this issue, and did not even mention the attorney-client privilege in the dual 
representation context. 
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. 1998), another 
of plaintiffs' cases, the court held that an insurer is not vicariously liable for malpractice 
committed by counsel the insurer selects to defend an insured. Traver did not, however, 
concern dual representation or the attorney-client privilege. Smith v. Anderson-Tulley 
Co., 608 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1985) and Jackson v. Trapier. 247 N.Y.S.2d 315 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1964), two other cases Spratley and Pearce cite, did not address the issue 
of attorney-client privilege between an insurer and defense counsel. 
The Court should decline appellants' invitation to join the minority. The district 
court correctly recognized the overlapping interests between insurer and insured 
justifying a privileged relationship with insurance defense counsel. If these interests 
diverge, the insurance defense counsel's primary duty is to the insured and counsel must 
take remedial measures. Unless and until an actual conflict arises, dual representation 
continues and the insurer may assert the attorney-client privilege.13 
At pages 39-40 of their brief, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce argue that State Farm's 
policyholders never consented to dual representation and that dual representation is 
therefore barred by Rule 1.7(b), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.7(b) 
prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation "may be materially 
limited" by the lawyer's responsibilities to another party unless (among other things) the 
client consents after consultation. Rule 1.7(b) simply never applied here because 
Spratley and Pearce's representation of policyholders was never "materially limited." 
Had their responsibilities to State Farm ever hindered their representation of 
policyholders, they were required by both Rule 1.7(b) and by State Farm policy to 
withdraw. Further, the language of the insurance policies in question gave State Farm the 
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C. Spratley and Pearce Owe a Duty of Confidentiality to State Farm 
Policyholders Under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
A second reason for the Order's injunctive provisions was to prevent Spratley and 
Pearce's violation of Rule 1.6, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. That rule provides 
that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client except 
as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after consultation." Paragraph (b) of 
Rule 1.6 then lists four exceptions, none of which applies here in relation to 
policyholders.14 Rule 1.6(a) thus precludes Messrs. Spratley and Pearce from revealing 
any information relating to their representation of State Farm's policyholders without 
their consent. "The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in 
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, 
whatever its source." Id. at cmt. This duty continues even after the attorney-client 
relationship is terminated. See Heinecke v. Utah Dept. of Comm., 810 P.2d 459, 468 
n.!4(UtahCt.App. 1991). 
right and the duty to defend policyholders in covered claims litigation. Courts construing 
such policies have held that they "invest the insurer with the complete control and 
direction of the defense . . . to the exclusion of the insured." Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co.. 978 F.2nd 927, 931-32 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing authorities); See also 
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 4th 782, 787 (1999). Under its policies 
with insured, State Farm had the right to select defense counsel on covered claims, 
approve the legal strategy, and approve any settlement. The policyholder's acceptance of 
these terms constituted "consent" to dual representation. 
14
 Paragraph (b) of rule 1.6 reads as follows: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of another; 
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fradulant act in the commission 
of which the lawyer's services had been used; 
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client or to establish a defense to a criminal charge ro civil claim against 
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved; or 
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
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The record developed to date shows that Messrs. Spratley and Pearce have 
repeatedly disclosed sensitive details of their representation of State Farm policyholders, 
without consent, in violation of Rule 1.6. The fourth set of affidavits they filed are 
riddled with facts relating to their representation of dozens of State Farm policyholders, 
including details of the policyholders' inculpatory conduct, family matters, and assets and 
income. (R. 1456-91; 1657-1740). Although some of these disclosures have come under 
seal, they were nevertheless made without consent in violation of Rule 1.6. More 
importantly, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce cannot try their case under seal. In the absence 
of the Order, facts protected by Rule 1.6 will inevitably be divulged to parties other than 
counsel and the courts. 
In their brief, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce never directly address the problem, 
except to note that they do not intend to violate Rule 1.6, ignoring the fact that they have 
already done so. State Farm has standing to raise its policyholders' rights because 
otherwise these rights are unlikely to be raised at all, and because such standing furthers 
the public's interest in confidential legal representation. See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 
1145, 1150 (Utah 1983), Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 51(3)(c). 
On this score, the Order was necessary and well within the district court's discretion. 
D. Spratley and Pearce Owe a Duty to State Farm Not to Disclose 
Confidential and Non-Public Information by Reason of Their Written 
Agreement with State Farm. 
The State Farm Code of Conduct required signators to maintain the confidence of 
all non-public information related to State Farm and its insureds which they obtained as a 
result of their employment. The Code of Conduct also specifically addressed the 
handling of confidential and privileged material relating to representation of State Farm 
and its insureds: "[t]o protect confidentiality and to preserve applicable legal privileges, 
the discussion of State Farm's legal matters should be restricted to those with a need to 
know." (R. 665, 668, 670-72). Both plaintiffs annually executed a written commitment 
to adhere to the State Farm Code of Conduct. Both plaintiffs breached it willfully. 
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Before the district court, State Farm presented this written agreement and pointed 
out that Spratley and Pearce's own filings with the district court demonstrated their 
breach of the agreement, first by taking confidential and privileged documents with them 
when they left State Farm, and then by filing them with the court. Spratley and Pearce 
have not contested this fact; instead, they ignore it. And they have demonstrated their 
intention to continue to disclose to the court and the public confidential and privileged 
information, documents, and files gathered while employed by State Farm. Once 
confidential or privileged documents are revealed, there is no way to remedy the breach 
of the duty to keep them confidential. Thus, the only practical means for protecting these 
materials was to enjoin Spratley and Pearce from disclosing them further. 
If Messrs. Spratley and Pearce wish to obtain confidential or privileged 
information and then use it to support their case, they may proceed under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to seek its discovery and a determination that it is not protected. The 
Order contemplates just such a process. But they are not free to ignore their written 
obligations to State Farm and its policyholders. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering its Order based on evidence that Spratley and Pearce breached an 
express agreement on confidentiality. 
HI. NEITHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT AND EVIDENCE, NOR WAIVER SHOULD RELIEVE 
SPRATLEY AND PEARCE OF THEIR DUTIES 
In response to the district court's determination that the Order was necessary to 
prevent further breaches of confidentiality and revelations of privileged information, 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce contend that their conduct falls within exceptions in the 
rules. They contend that they are entitled to rely on an exception to Utah Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.6's ban on disclosure of information relating to representation of 
a client, on several exceptions to the attorney-client privilege contained in Utah Rule of 
Evidence 504, and on State Farm's alleged waiver of any claim of confidentiality. As 
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will be shown below, there is no merit to any of these post hoc rationalizations for 
Spratley and Pearce's willful disclosures of confidential information. 
A. Rule 1.6(b)(3) Does Not Allow Spratley and Pearce to Disclose 
Privileged Information 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce argue that Rule 1.6(b)(3), Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, allows them to violate their duties of confidentiality to State Farm. Rule 
1.6(b)(3) provides: 
"A lawyer may reveal such [confidential] information 
[pertaining to the relationship between the attorney and the 
client] to the extent the lawyer believes necessary . . . [t]o 
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client or to establish 
a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved." 
Spratley and Pearce contend that because they assert a claim against State Farm, they are 
free to disclose all confidential information gained as a result of the relationship. State 
Farm and the other defendants disagree for two reasons. 
First, Rule 1.6 imposes upon Spratley and Pearce a broad obligation of 
confidentiality not only with respect to State Farm, but also with respect to the 
policyholders whom Spratley and Pearce represented. Although Spratley and Pearce may 
have a dispute with State Farm, they have never asserted claims against its policyholders. 
As a result, they cannot justify the disclosure of information pertaining to their 
representation of policyholders by referring to rule 1.6(b)(3). 
Second, Rule 1.6(b)(3) does not constitute an exemption from the attorney-client 
privilege under Utah Rule of Evidence 504. The Preamble to the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct provides that the Rules are "not intended to govern or affect 
judicial application of either the client-lawyer or work product privilege." Utah R. Prof. 
Conduct, Preamble. "The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the Rules 
has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition 
that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating 
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to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed." Id. Hence, as a matter of Utah law, Rule 
1.6(b)(3) does not affect the attorney-client privilege's application to Spratley and 
Pearce's communications with State Farm. And it certainly has no bearing on a written 
agreement of confidentiality executed as a condition of their employment. 
The protections of Rule 1.6 are different from the attorney-client privilege, both in 
terms of purpose and scope; exceptions recognized under one have no bearing on the 
scope of the other. Rule 1.6 confidentiality is broader than the privilege, applying "not 
merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source." Utah R. Prof. Conduct, 1.6 cmt. Rule 
"1.6 is much broader than the attorney-client privilege." Samaritan Foundation v. 
GoodfarK 862 P.2d 870, 889 (Ariz. 1993). As recognized in In re Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000), on which Messrs. Spratley and Pearce rely, "by its 
plain language, Rule 1.6 . . . extends to all communications between insureds and defense 
counsel and this rule is therefore broader in both scope and protection than the attorney-
client privilege." Id at 822.15 Since Rule 1.6 is broad in scope, its exceptions are also 
broad. The attorney-client privilege, by contrast, provides protection to a narrowly 
defined set of communications, and its exceptions are correspondingly narrow. See id. 
Exceptions to Rule 1.6 were never designed to negate the privilege, and Rule 1.6(b)(3) 
provides neither an exception to the privilege, nor a valid basis for a challenge to the 
Order. 
Burkhart v. Semitool Inc., 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000), a case cited by Spratley and 
Pearce, illustrates the point. At issue in Burkhart was whether in-house counsel are 
categorically precluded from bringing claims against their employer. See id. at 1036. 
The court permitted such claims, "as long as such an action may be proven within the 
15
 See Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 
1998); Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979); 
In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 322 (R.I. 1993); State v. 
Sheppard, 763 P2d 1232, 1235 (Wash. App. 1988). 
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confines of the attorney's respective ethical obligations to maintain client confidences." 
Id. The court noted that the "claim or defense" exception to Rule 1.6 applies to such 
claims. See id. at 1042. However, the court cautioned that this exception does not extend 
to privileged communications. Specifically, the court stated that "'where the elements of 
a wrongful discharge . . . claim cannot, for reasons peculiar to the particular case, be fully 
established without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit must be dismissed in 
the interest of preserving the privilege.'" Id, 1038 (quoting General Dynamics Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503-04 (Cal. 1994)).16 
B. The "Breach of Duty Exception" Under Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3) Does 
Not Apply to this Dispute 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce also contend that they may ignore their confidentiality 
obligations under the "breach of duty" exception in Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3), which 
provides that "[n]o privilege exists under this rule . . . [a]s to a communication relevant to 
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer." This 
exception does not extend to the type of dispute presented by this case because courts 
have wisely limited its application to only two types of cases: (1) clients' lawsuits 
against lawyers for malpractice, and (2) lawyers' lawsuits against clients for unpaid fees. 
For rule 504(d)(3)'s purposes, "'breach of duty by the attorney usually involves 
professional malpractice, incompetence, or ethical violations, while a breach by a client 
usually means not paying a fee.'" Bvrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Kan. 
1996)(citation omitted). In client versus lawyer cases, the "exception to an attorney's 
duty to guard client confidences creates a defensive mechanism for lawyers under siege." 
3 Weinstein Federal Evidence § 503.33 (2d ed. 2001). In lawyer versus client cases, Rule 
504(d)(3) "means that the client cannot assert the privilege to prevent revelation of his 
16
 Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int'l Inc., 2002 WL 1050247 (Tenn. 2002), another 
case cited by Spratley and Pearce, discusses only Rule 1.6 and never mentions the 
separate attorney-client privilege. 
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secrets when the lawyer sues to recover his fee." See also Wright & Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 5503 at 534. Apart from a lawyer's claims for fees, "the 
exception is designed to function only as a shield, not as a sword." Siedle v. Putnam 
Invs., 147 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1998). "The attorney should not be permitted to use 
confidential information offensively." 3 Weinstein Federal Evidence § 503.33. 
Courts and commentators thus favor "a strict construction" of the breach of duty 
exception. See Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5503 at 542. 
Accordingly, "[t]he exclusion has been interpreted to be very limited." Shafnaker v. 
Clayton, 680 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996). They reason that if Rule 504(d)(3) 
were not narrowly interpreted, the breach of duty exception "might open the door to a 
form of genteel blackmail in which the client is coerced into settling a questionable claim 
by fear of exposure of his confidences." Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5503 at 542. In applying the exception, "sound policy requires the court to 
insure that the threat of divulgence is not held over the client's head as a tactical 
weapon." 3 Weinstein Federal Evidence § 503.33 (2d ed. 2001). 
In this case, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce hold privileged communications over 
State Farm's head as a tactical weapon, not as a defensive refuge or a means of collecting 
unpaid fees. State Farm is not suing them for malpractice, and rule 504(d)(3)'s "breach 
of duty" exception does not permit them to violate the privilege. This case concerns the 
propriety of Spratley and Pearce's interactions with State Farm's claims department, and 
is far removed from a fee collection case. Spratley and Pearce may only wield rule 
504(d)(3) as a shield, not as a sword, and it does not exempt them from their obligations 
under the attorney-client privilege. 
Spratley and Pearce support their reliance on rule 504(d)(3) by citing Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Ass'n v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (1997), a case dealing solely with the work 
17
 Even in fee collection cases, "[i]t has been suggested that the exception should be more 
carefully examined when the attorney sues the client for a fee than when the client sues 
the attorney." Id. 
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product doctrine, not the privilege, and which specifically noted that the work product 
doctrine is "[u]nlike the privilege." Id at 590. They also cite Kalyawongsa v. Moffett 
105 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 1997), a fee collection case that expressly recognized the 
exception's limitation to disclosures "necessary to establish the fee or defend against 
accusations of wrongful conduct." Id. at 291. They also cite First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. 
Oppenheim, Appel Dixon & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), a case that rejected 
the application of rule 504(d)(3), noting its limited application and that it does "not 
contemplate an exception to the privilege merely because it [is] in the attorney's 
pecuniary or legal interest to make the disclosure." Id. at 561. 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce insist that they may disclose privileged 
communications under rule 504(d)(3) because State Farm has raised their poor 
professional performance as an affirmative defense. The affirmative defense, however, 
would not exist without Spratley and Pearce's claims; they may not bootstrap an 
affirmative defense into an abrogation of the principles governing rule 504(d)(3). Under 
the breach of duty exception, "[t]he mere bringing of the action . . . does not necessarily 
forfeit a client's protection under the privilege." Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
United States, (West 1999). "That the privileged communications occurred in the course 
of a transaction which is later litigated [does] not eliminate the privilege." Volpe v. 
Conrov, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 720 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998). 
C. The "Crime or Fraud" Exception Under Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(1) Does 
Not Apply to this Dispute 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce also argue that their conduct is excused under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 504(d)(1), which provides that no attorney-client privilege exists "[i]f 
the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or 
plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or 
fraud". State Farm and the other defendants deny that they were party to any fraud or 
crime; they also deny that plaintiffs have adequately pled either fraud or a crime. The 
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more important point, however, is that plaintiffs have failed to follow the universally 
recognized procedure for invoking this exception. "To invoke the crime-fraud exception, 
the party opposing the privilege must present prima facie evidence that the allegation of 
attorney participation in the crime or fraud has some foundation in fact." Intervenor v. 
United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas), 144 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir. 1998). See 
U.S. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 566 (1989); Haines v. Liggett, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96 (3rd Cir. 
1992). Once such a preliminary showing is made, the court should conduct an in camera 
review of the privileged material to determine if the crime-fraud exception applies. See 
id. Only after a prima facie showing, in camera, that the exception applies may parties 
publicly disclose otherwise privileged material. See id. See also Intervenor, 144 F.3d at 
660; In re General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1998). 
Spratley and Pearce have not even pretended to comply with the requirements of 
rule 504(d)(1). Instead of seeking to establish that the crime-fraud exception applies and 
then disclosing the information, they unilaterally disclosed privileged material to the 
court and the public, hoping that they could later establish the prerequisites of the 
exception. They seek forgiveness for their breach of the attorney-client privilege, 
apparently well aware that they could not make the showing necessary for permission. 
As one district court has said, "[i]n no procedural context may the bare, unilateral 
assertion that the crime-fraud exception applies justify disclosure." Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Massaro, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985, *30 (D. NJ. 2000). 
The Third Circuit recently upheld this principle in its opinion affirming the district 
court in Massaro. The Third Circuit rejected the same "crime/fraud" argument asserted 
by an in-house lawyer for an insurance company who tried to sue his former employer. 
The court held that the 
use of privileged material under the crime/fraud exception 
requires a three-step judicial process: (1) presentation of the 
factual basis for a good faith belief that the exception would 
apply, (2) in camera evaluation of the material by the court, 
220719 8 4 2 
and (3) affording the party opposed to disclosure "an absolute 
right to be heard by testimony and argument." 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Massaro, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14560 at *4 (3d Cir. July 18, 
2002) (citation omitted). The court noted that Prudential's in-house lawyer, Massaro, 
"obviously complied with none of these procedural niceties designed to protect his client, 
Prudential, from an improvident assertion of the crime-fraud [exception to the] privilege. 
Massaro had no right unilaterally to invoke the crime-fraud exception." Id. (alteration in 
original). Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the injunction entered by the trial court 
preventing Massaro from disclosing privileged information. See id. 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce do not seriously claim that they can make even a 
prima facie showing that the crime-fraud exception applies. They assert only that the 
evidence is "sufficient to raise a fact issue" as to the exception's applicability. (App. Br. 
at 51). Raising a fact issue does not entitle Spratley and Pearce to make wholesale 
disclosures of privileged communications under the crime-fraud exception. And even 
this premise—that a fact issue was presented—was rejected by the district court when it 
held that Spratley and Pearce's Complaint, which attached privileged communications, 
failed to meet the bare pleading requirements for fraud. (R. 1456-91; 1657-1740). 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce attempt 1o buttress their position by citing Hermansen 
v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, which concerned the spousal privilege and did not 
even mention the attorney-client privilege. The spousal privilege at issue in Hermansen 
contains an exception for simple torts—an exception absent from the attorney-client 
privilege and was intentionally left out by the drafting committee. See id. at f 35; Utah 
R. Evid. 504 cmt. Even in addressing the broader exceptions to the spousal privilege, this 
court still held that "[t]o preserve the purpose of the privilege, it cannot be found to be 
inapplicable simply because a party alleges a tort or crime. There must be sufficient 
evidence, independent of the communication, to support a finding that it was so made." 
Hermansen, 2002 UT at f36. 
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the crime-fraud 
exception could not be invoked under the circumstances presented in this case 
D. State Farm Has Not Waived Its Rights 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce argue that State Farm has waived any claim of 
attorney-client privilege because it has disclosed general information related to its CLC 
office. (App. Br. at 42-45). This argument, of course, does not address the 
confidentiality that Spratley and Pearce owe to State Farm under the Code of Conduct, 
nor does it address their obligations to policyholders under Rule 1.6. But even as to the 
attorney-client privilege, the facts do not support plaintiffs' contention that the privilege 
was waived. 
The attorney-client privilege is not waived unless the "holder of the privilege 
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or 
communication, or fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure." 
Utah R. Evid. 507(a). The "disclosure of insubstantial communications protected by the 
attorney-client privilege [does] not waive the privilege as to substantial matters." Doe v. 
Maret 1999 UT 74,116, 984 P.2d 980, 986. Messrs. Spratley and Pearce argue, in 
effect, that State Farm waived its right to assert the privilege with respect to all its 
communications with them by making public some general information about the Claims 
Litigation Counsel program. 
Specifically, they quote a pamphlet entitled "State Farm Insurance Companies 
Claim Litigation Counsel," with general statements about the CLC program's structure, 
purpose, and administration. (R. 1320-31). They cite statements in a legal brief filed by 
State Farm that generally describe the CLC program's organization and administration. 
(R. 1286-98). They cite a letter sent by State Farm's General Counsel to CLC attorneys. 
The letter prescribes general litigation standards of conduct for CLC attorneys. (R. 1173-
77). Each of these communications was made public; none of them was maintained in 
confidence. 
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The hallmark of the attorney-client privilege, however, is confidentiality. The 
communications the disclosure of which is now of concern are those confidential 
communications made between attorney and client to assist in the rendition of legal 
services. The argument that by publishing general information about the CLC program 
State Farm waived the protection of the privilege as to confidential matters is absurd. 
But whether or not Spratley and Pearce's waiver claim has any merit, the district 
court's Order does not preclude them from seeking a determination that State Farm has 
waived the privilege as to particular documents. Issues of waiver must be decided on a 
document-by-document basis, not on the wholesale basis advanced by appellants. The 
district court's Order established a basic framework within which the parties can make 
decisions with respect to particular documents. That Order was well within the district 
court's discretion. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ENJOINED SPRATLEY AND 
PEARCE FROM FURTHER VIOLATIONS OF THEIR DUTIES 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce contend that the district court improperly enjoined 
them from future disclosures of confidential and privileged information and documents. 
State Farm answers that the Order fell within the court's discretion granted by Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65A to issue a preliminary injunction. The threatened violation of a 
lawyer's duty to refrain from misusing client confidences "has been recognized as the 
basis for an injunction for at least a century." Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & 
Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1285 (Penn. 1992); accord Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 6. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e) permits the district court 
to enter a preliminary injunction upon a showing that: (i) State Farm will likely prevail 
on the merits; (ii) State Farm will suffer irreparable injury without an injunction; (iii) the 
threatened injury to State Farm outweighs whatever harm Spratley and Pearce may incur 
from an injunction; and (iv) an injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. State 
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Farm satisfied its burden on each of these points, and the district court properly entered 
the Order. 
A. State Farm is Likely to Prevail on the Merits 
In proceedings below, State Farm first demonstrated that Spratley and Pearce 
acted as its attorneys. As this court recently held, u[a]n attorney-client relationship exists 
when the client reasonably believes the client represents the client's legal interests." 
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f 32. State Farm submitted six affidavits from corporate, 
CLC, and claims employees detailing their reasonable belief that Spratley and Pearce 
represented State Farm's legal interests while employed as CLC attorneys, and 
referencing specific documents in which confidential facets of this representation were 
communicated. (R. 633-74). Spratley and Pearce offered argument on the topic but no 
evidence refuting these affidavits. (R. 690). 
State Farm next demonstrated that Spratley and Pearce took from State Farm and 
then disclosed in this lawsuit documents that were confidential or privileged. The record 
is replete with disclosures that evidence a breach of the written confidentiality agreement 
and of the duty owed to State Farm and policyholders under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The record also demonstrates plaintiffs' repeated violation of the 
1 O 
attorney-client privilege. 
In the face of such a showing, courts have almost uniformly enjoined attorneys 
from disclosing their former clients' confidences. For example, in Prudential Insurance 
Co. v. Massanx 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985 (D. N.J. 2000), aff d, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14560 (3rd Cir. July 18, 2002), Prudential sought an injunction against its former 
18
 The following documents disclosed by plaintiffs fall squarely within the privilege: 
Exhibit 5 to plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 51-53 ) and Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Brett 
Pearce (R. 347); Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Affidavit of Richard Spratley (R. 347); Exhibit 2 
to the Affidavit of Brett Pearce (R. 347); Exhibit 4 to the Second Affidavit of Richard 
Spratley (R. 690). For the convenience of the court, summaries of these exhibits are 
included as Addendum 4 to this brief. 
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in-house attorney, Massaro, to prevent the disclosure of confidential information. After 
challenging Prudential's sales practices, Massaro retained an attorney who was already 
prosecuting cases against Prudential. Massaro disclosed Prudential's confidential 
information to his attorney and, ultimately, the public. Prudential sued to enjoin any 
further disclosure of privileged information. The court concluded that Massaro violated 
his duties to Prudential because "[i]n-house counsel devote all of their professional legal 
skills to their sole corporate client. A corporate client is entitled to consider that an in-
house lawyer will protect its interests and preserve its confidences in any and all legal 
matters." Id. at *24. Based on its finding that Massaro breached his duties, the court 
concluded that Prudential had satisfied the "success on the merits" prong of the 
permanent injunction test. See id. at *48. 
Likewise, in X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992), Doe took copies 
of X Corp.'s files upon leaving his position as X Corp.'s in-house counsel. Doe later 
threatened to disclose confidential documents in a wrongful termination suit against X 
Corp. The latter sued Doe to enjoin disclosure of confidential information, and the court 
issued a preliminary injunction barring Doe's disclosure of his former client's 
confidential information. See id. at 1301-02. 
Similarly, in Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), a corporation's 
former in-house counsel filed a shareholder's derivative suit against his former employer. 
In his complaint, the plaintiff made use of facts he acquired while performing legal 
services for his employer. See id. at 1354. The court noted that an attorney's motive for 
disclosing confidential information makes little difference. Instead, the "determinative 
factor is that the attorney's action will result in disclosure of communications made in 
confidence by the client to the lawyer." Id, at 1355. The court concluded that the 
attorney had violated his duties to his former employer/client and enjoined the attorney 
from disclosing confidential information. See id. at 1356. 
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In Breckenridge v. Bristol-Myers Co., 624 F. Supp. 79 (S.D. Ind. 1985), an in-
house attorney brought an age discrimination claim against his former client/employer. 
In attempting to make his case against his former employer, the attorney took documents 
from his employer's files. The court noted that "[a]ccess to [privileged and confidential] 
documents by an aggrieved employee/attorney does not grant him license to collect and 
disseminate their contents because he believes it helpful to his cause of action." Id. at 83. 
The court ordered that the attorney-litigant return confidential and privileged information, 
and directed that such information could not be used in the litigation. See id. at 84.19 
This case is factually indistinguishable from the foregoing cases. Like the lawyers 
in all of these cases, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce were in-house counsel who disclosed 
and threatened to disclose their former client/employer's confidential information in a 
lawsuit against their employer. As in Prudential Spratley and Pearce have retained 
attorneys who are actively representing parties adverse to their former employer in other 
litigation, and they have revealed confidential information to those attorneys. As in all of 
the foregoing cases, Spratley and Pearce were properly enjoined from further violation of 
their confidentiality obligations. 
Spratley and Pearce challenge the preliminary injunction by attempting to re-cast 
the Order as a ruling on the privilege's applicability to specific documents and by arguing 
that State Farm failed to show that certain of the documents Spratley and Pearce 
disclosed were privileged. The Order, however, was intended to give general, 
prospective direction to the parties and to reestablish the status quo before Spratley and 
Pearce took confidential and privileged documents from State Farm. Nothing in the 
19
 See also Hyman Co., Inc. v. Brozost 119 F. Supp.2d 499, 505 (E.D. Penn. 2000) 
(enjoining former in-house attorney from disclosing former employer's confidential 
information); American Motors v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 121 (Ohio 1991) 
(enjoining former in-house attorney from testifying against former client/employer); 
Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1287 (Penn. 1992) 
(enjoining corporation's former attorneys from representing corporation's competitors 
because allowing such representation "would create too great a danger that [the former 
client's] confidential relationship with [its former attorneys] would be breached"). 
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Order precludes Spratley and Pearce from contesting a claim of confidentiality and/or 
privilege as to any specific document. 
In light of the evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that State Farm is likely to prevail on the merits of its privilege claim. 
B. State Farm Faced Irreparable Harm Unless Spratley and Pearce Were 
Enjoined 
The second element necessary for a preliminary injunction is a showing that the 
movant will suffer irreparable injury without an injunction. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
65A(e)(ii). State Farm certainly made this showing. 
Over the decade of their employment with State Farm, Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce accumulated confidential, privileged, and proprietary knowledge concerning State 
Farm and its insureds. This case has just begun, and yet Spratley and Pearce have already 
disclosed confidential information, without court authorization or client consent. More 
such disclosures were inevitable without an injunction. Once confidences are disclosed, 
their secrecy cannot be recaptured. As one court noted, "[o]nce confidential attorney-
client communications are disclosed, their confidential nature is permanently and 
irrevocably impaired. Even if [the client] were ultimately to prevail, its right to prevent 
disclosures of confidential information might be forever lost absent a preliminary 
injunction." X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1303-04 (E.D. Va. 1992). This is 
irreparable harm at its most basic level. 
The Order simply put an end to Spratley and Pearce's practice of violating State 
Farm's confidentiality rights. In the process, the Order prevents irreparable harm. 
C. The Balance of Harms Favored State Farm 
The third requirement for a preliminary injunction under rule 65 A is that the 
threatened injury to the moving party be shown to outweigh whatever harm the injunction 
will cause to the other party. See Utah R.Civ.P. 65A(e)(iii). As shown above, the 
threatened harm to State Farm is irreparable. Once confidential or privileged information 
is disclosed, it cannot be returned to a confidential or privileged status. While State Farm 
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will suffer irreparable injury without the Order, the only "harm" to Messrs. Spratley and 
Pearce from the preliminary injunction is that they will be enjoined from using protected 
information that they had no right to use in the first instance. 
The Order is narrowly drawn in the sense that it only preliminarily prevents 
Spratley and Pearce from disclosing privileged and protected information. If a particular 
document, communication, or fact is ultimately determined to be neither privileged nor 
otherwise protected, then it may be used. In short, there can be no "harm" to Spratley 
and Pearce from an order precluding their use of information which, by definition, the 
law protects from disclosure. 
D. The District Court's Order Was Not Adverse to the Public Interest 
The final requirement for a preliminary injunction is that the moving party show it 
will not be adverse to the public interest. See Utah R.Civ.P. 65A(e)(iv). Here, the 
district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction advanced the public's interest in 
protecting the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. 
The critical role that the attorney-client privilege plays in 
facilitating the administration of justice is beyond question . . 
. . the interest in preserving a durable barrier against 
disclosure of privileged attorney-client information is shared 
both by particular litigants and by the public, and it is an 
interest of considerable magnitude. 
Siedle v. Putnam Inv., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). "The 
public interest in enforcing the attorney-client privilege and attorney's duty of 
confidentiality is self-evident." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Massaro, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11985, *51 (D. N.J. 2000). To condone flagrant disclosures of privileged information 
would damage "both to the bar's perception of its own responsibilities and to the public's 
perception of the sanctity of the trust it places in its attorneys." Id. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING STATE FARM A PROTECTIVE ORDER UNDER UTAH 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(C) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that a party may obtain a protective 
order "for good cause shown" to protect a party from "annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense" by ordering that "discovery not be had" or "that 
certain matters not be inquired into". The district court "is entrusted with broad 
discretion in dealing with discovery matters, namely, protective orders." In re Pendleton, 
11 P.3d 284, 294 (Utah 2000). The Order prevents Messrs. Spratley and Pearce from 
using, disclosing, or seeking the disclosure of confidential and privileged information in 
litigating this case without following the ordinary procedures provided in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
State Farm made the requisite showing of "good cause" for a protective order 
under Rule 26(c) when it demonstrated Spratley and Pearce's disclosures of protected 
information and their intent to continue to make such disclosures. "Adverse use of 
confidential information is not limited to disclosure. It includes knowing what to ask for 
in discovery, which witnesses to seek to depose, what questions to ask them, what lines 
of attack to abandon and what lines to pursue." Ulrich v. Hearst Corp., 809 F. Supp. 229, 
235 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Accordingly, "the attorney-client privilege provides sufficient 
'good cause' under Rule 26(c) to grant a protective order." Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. 
McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
State Farm had a privileged and confidential relationship with Spratley and Pearce, 
who are now using or threatening to use communications and information gleaned from 
this relationship to sue State Farm. The Order properly prevents them from further 
violating their duties to State Farm by disclosing or otherwise using confidential 
communications in this lawsuit. 
220719 8 51 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISQUALIFIED CHRISTENSEN & 
JENSEN 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce and their law firm, Christensen & Jensen challenge 
the premise that a lawyer should ever be disqualified on the ground that the client 
disclosed protected information to the lawyer. They assert that if the premise is correct, 
no one with confidential or privileged information could obtain counsel because if the 
client discloses the information, the party entitled to confidentiality will be able to 
disqualify his opponent's lawyer. (App. Br. at 66-69.) We respectfully submit that this 
argument distorts the facts before the district court and ignores the factual basis for the 
disqualification order. 
Christensen & Jensen is not just another law firm to which a client revealed 
confidential information about a party the client wanted to sue. Rather, Christensen & 
Jensen is actively representing other clients in suits against State Farm; those suits raise 
challenges to many of the same practices of which Spratley and Pearce complain. The 
confidential and privileged information that Spratley and Pearce have so far disclosed, as 
well as the information they presumably possess but have not yet revealed to State Farm, 
relates directly to those other suits. Christensen & Jensen would never have obtained 
access to this information if they had not represented Spratley and Pearce. Even the legal 
"expert" retained by Spratley and Pearce regarding this issue conceded that "[i]f Spratley 
and Pearce have violated their ethical or legal duties to State Farm in providing 
information to Humpherys then Humpherys can be disqualified on the grounds that the 
information he has acquired is 'tainted.'" (R. 715). This Court should hold that the 
district court's disqualification Order was not an abuse of discretion. 
A. The District Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard for 
Disqualification 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce contend that Utah law provides no clear legal 
standard for determining disqualification claims in cases like the present one. (App. Br. 
at 66 In Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), however, 
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the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the grounds for disqualifying attorneys who have 
impermissibly obtained confidences belonging to another attorney's former client. 
Although it did not definitively rule on the merits of the plaintiffs motion to disqualify 
opposing counsel, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the following inquiries govern 
disqualification in this situation: 
(1) whether the disclosing party had "confidential or 
privileged information pertaining to [the movant's] trial 
preparation and strategy"; (2) whether the disclosing party 
disclosed that information to opposing counsel; and (3) 
whether, in light of such disclosure, opposing counsel's 
"continued representation . . . threatens to 'taint' all further 
proceedings in this case." 
Id at 1081 (citations omitted). This formulation of relevant factors is consistent 
with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and with factors considered by courts in 
other jurisdictions in cases that are strikingly similar to this case. In applying these 
In addition to the disqualification test stated in Cade, the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct mandate that, even in the absence of an attorney-client relationship with the 
affected client, a lawyer is not permitted to facilitate another lawyer's impermissible 
disclosure of client confidences: 
Not only is every lawyer responsible for observing the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, but the lawyer should also aid in 
securing observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct by 
other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises 
the independence of the profession and the public interest 
which it serves. 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . knowingly 
assist or induce another to . . . to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct... or do so through the acts of another. 
Utah R. Prof. Conduct, Preamble & 8.4(a). Having represented State Farm as in-house 
counsel for over ten years, Spratley and Pearce unquestionably could not represent parties 
adverse to State Farm in matters that are substantially related to those in which Spratley 
and Pearce advised State Farm. See id. at 1.9(a). Nor could Spratley and Pearce use their 
privileged communications with State Farm in aid of other parties' claims against State 
Farm and its insureds. See id. at 1.9(b). Yet bv retaining Christensen & Jensen in this 
action, Spratley and Pearce are able to violate these duties through the acts of another. 
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factors, the principal concern of the courts has been to preserve the confidentiality of 
privileged communications. "In considering disqualification courts 'must be mindful that 
the interests of the clients are primary, and the interests of the lawyers are secondary."5 
Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp.2d 1195, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2001)(disqualifying counsel 
for improper access to opposing party's privileged information)(citations omitted). 
Accordingly, "any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification." MMR/Wallace 
Power & Indust, Inc. v. Thames Assoc, 764 F. Supp. 712, 719 (D. Conn. 1991). 
Application of the Cade factors to this case demonstrates why the district court properly 
disqualified Christensen & Jensen. 
B. Spratley and Pearce Possess Confidential and Privileged Information 
Pertaining to State Farm's Litigation Strategies 
The first factor to be considered is whether the party disclosing information to the 
lawyer challenged for disqualification possesses confidential information pertaining to 
issues relevant to the suit in question. By an extension of reasoning, it would also be 
relevant that the party disclosing the information has confidential information relevant to 
other suits being handled by the lawyer against the same defendant. 
Like all CLC attorneys, Spratley and Pearce routinely engaged in candid 
discussions with State Farm claims personnel regarding the handling of litigation against 
State Farm and its insureds. In the process of litigating dozens of cases, they necessarily 
discussed discovery strategy, potential defenses, the legal and factual merits of claims, 
settlement criteria, and trial strategy with State Farm claims personnel. All of these 
discussions were privileged and confidential. As State Farm's attorneys, Spratley and 
Pearce themselves generated privileged and confidential communications with the claims 
personnel named as defendants in this case, and with their colleagues. They also advised 
State Farm regarding legislative developments, coverage issues, and conflicts of interest 
between State Farm and its insureds. In this case, Spratley and Pearce predicate their 
claims on privileged communications with State Farm. As demonstrated in Part 4 of the 
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Facts, above, and Part IVA of this Argument, above, the communications offered by 
State Farm to support disqualification unquestionably (1) were directed to specific 
individuals; (2) relate primarily or exclusively to legal services; (3) concern specific 
aspects of litigation; and (4) were maintained in complete confidence until disclosed by 
plaintiffs in this case. (R. 633-74).21 
In addition to privileged information pertinent to the claims asserted in this case, 
Spratley and Pearce possess privileged information relevant to other cases that 
Christensen & Jensen is currently prosecuting against State Farm and its insureds. State 
Farm's litigation strategy concerning trial, settlement, discovery, and expert witnesses 
disclosed in this case are relevant to other cases that Christensen & Jensen is prosecuting. 
For example, State Farm's litigation strategies and claims handling practices are at issue 
in the Mosier and Fidel cases, in which Christensen & Jensen is suing State Farm for bad 
faith. These cases challenge State Farm's excess judgment policies—the same policies 
that Spratley and Pearce have made part of this case. 
But beyond strategy questions, Spratley and Pearce possess privileged information 
relating specifically to cases that Christensen & Jensen is currently prosecuting against 
State Farm. Notably, Mr. Spratley wrote a privileged memorandum to State Farm in 
March 1994 concerning the Campbell case, which also concerned allegations of bad faith 
by State Farm. In that memorandum, Mr. Spratley discussed his independent evaluation 
of the Campbell case and referenced his earlier review of the Campbell file. (R. 660-62). 
Mr. Spratley has now disclosed this memorandum to Christensen & Jensen—the 
attorneys representing the plaintiffs against State Farm in Campbell. (R. 690: Second 
Spratley Aff, ^ 13 & Exh. 4). 
See also Addendum 4 to this brief, which provides specific information about some of 
the privileged communications disclosed by plaintiffs in this case. 
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The first prong of the Cade test is therefore unquestionably met. Spratley and 
Pearce possess privileged information critical in this case and others being litigated by 
Christensen & Jensen against State Farm and its insureds. 
C. Spratley and Pearce Have Disclosed, and Will Continue Disclosing, 
State Farm's Confidential and Privileged Information to Christensen 
& Jensen 
The second factor in Cade is "whether the disclosing party disclosed that 
information to opposing counsel." 956 P.2d at 1081. The privileged information 
appearing in exhibits to Spratley and Pearce's Complaint and affidavits have, of course, 
already been disclosed to Christensen & Jensen. In addition, Spratley and Pearce5s 
Complaint contains allegations that hinge on confidential attorney-client 
communications. (R. 9-10, 13). In making these allegations, Christensen & Jensen could 
not have fulfilled their obligation to the court under Utah R. Civ. P. 11 without having 
investigated the confidential communications upon which these allegations are based. 
The allegations of the Complaint compel the conclusion that, unless they are restrained, 
Spratley and Pearce will continue disclosing privileged information to Christensen & 
Jensen. 
Authorities considering similar cases have held that such disclosures should be 
presumed. See generally Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.10, cmt. ("Preserving confidentiality is 
a question of access to information. Access to information, in turn, is essentially a 
question of fact in particular circumstances, aided by inferences, deductions or working 
presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work 
together."). In a case with facts strikingly similar to this, the Second Circuit held that the 
court need not "'inquire whether the lawyer did, in fact, receive confidential 
information'. . . . The breach of confidence would not have to be proved; it is presumed." 
Hull v. Celanese Corp.. 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2nd Cir. 1975) (citation omitted). In Huh, the 
court considered disqualification of counsel where "the in-house counsel for [the 
defendant] switched sides to become a plaintiff (rather than a lawyer) on the other side." 
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Id. The plaintiffs counsel represented a number of claimants in similar sexual 
harassment claims against the defendant, Celanese. See id. at 569. The plaintiffs' 
counsel sought to assert a similar claim on behalf of Delulio, Celanese's former in-house 
attorney. See id. Although she never entered an appearance for Celanese in any of the 
sexual harassment cases involving the plaintiffs' counsel, Delulio was nevertheless 
involved in such cases, obtaining information, attending meetings, and preparing and 
receiving memoranda. See id. at 570 & n.9. When the plaintiffs' counsel attempted to 
assert a sexual harassment claim on Delulio's behalf, Celanese moved to disqualify the 
plaintiffs' counsel. See id. at 569. The trial court granted Celanese's motion, ruling that 
Delulio possessed privileged and confidential information, and that disqualification was 
necessary to prevent "the on-going possibility for improper disclosure." IcL at 570. 
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's disqualification of Delulio's lawyer, 
finding a presumption that Delulio divulged privileged information to her lawyer. See id. 
at 572. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that u[h]ad Delulio joined the 
[plaintiffs'] firm as an assistant counsel in the [plaintiffs'] case, they would have been 
disqualified. Here she joined them as a client. The relation is no less damaging and the 
presumption [of disclosure] should apply." IcL at 572. The Second Circuit held that, in 
this situation, "disqualification is 'a necessary and desirable remedy . . . to enforce the 
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity and to guard against the danger of inadvertent use of 
confidential information.'" Id. at 571. 
Like Delulio's involvement in the case against her employer, Mr. Spratley advised 
State Farm in the Campbell case without entering an appearance. (R. 660-62; R. 690: 
Second Spratley Aff, Exh. 4). Like Delulio, Mr. Spratley obtained information and 
prepared and received memoranda on a host of litigation issues. Meanwhile, Christensen 
& Jensen represents the plaintiffs against State Farm in the Campbell case and in other 
cases involving similar issues. Hull's logic is inescapable in this case: Had Spratley and 
Pearce joined Christensen & Jensen as counsel in the Campbell case (or other cases in 
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which they could use State Farm's confidences), Spratley and Pearce would have been 
disqualified. Here Spratley and Pearce joined Christensen & Jensen, as it were, as a 
client. Since the relation is no less damaging, the presumption of disclosure should 
apply.22 
In a case almost identical to this case, the court followed the Hull rationale to 
disqualify an attorney retained by a former in-house attorney for an insurance company. 
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Massaro, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985 (D. N.J. 2000), 
Massaro, a former in-house attorney for Prudential, retained an attorney, Miller, to 
represent him a dispute with Prudential. At that time, Miller represented claimants in 
disputes with Prudential involving similar issues, including a case on which Massaro had 
worked while at Prudential. See id. at **6-9. Prudential moved to disqualify Miller, 
asserting that "Miller had access to Prudential's confidential and privileged information 
by virtue of his representation of its former attorney, Massaro." Id at ** 10-11. 
In an unpublished decision, a magistrate judge recommended that Miller be 
disqualified, and a district court judge adopted this recommendation. The court noted 
that "[r]ather than an attorney who has switched sides," the disqualification motion 
"involves an attorney who has become the client of counsel for the other side." See In re 
Prudential Insurance Company of America Sales Practice Litigation, Case No. 954704, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, filed February 20, 1997, at 24.23 The court concluded 
Other courts agree that there need not be proof of actual disclosure of 
confidential information when the circumstances make it a reasonable inference. "[T]he 
court need not 'inquire whether the lawyer did, in fact, receive confidential information'. 
. . . the possibility that breach of these confidences was committed . . . is sufficient to 
make disqualification a necessary and desirable remedy." NCK Organization, Ltd. v. 
Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134 (2nd Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). In situations like that 
posed by this case, "a presumption arises that confidences have been imparted" by former 
employee to his counsel in pursuing claim against his former employer. Williams v. 
TWA, 588 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (D. Mo. 1984). 
Copies of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendations and the district court's 
Opinion adopting the Report and Recommendations are attached as Addendum 3. 
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that "[t]he attorney need not have actually divulged client confidences to the other side in 
order to be disqualified. Actual disclosure is not the test; rather the test is whether there 
is a risk that confidential information has been used unfairly," and that "[a]ny doubts 
must be resolved in favor of disqualification." See id. at 23-24. The court found that "if 
Massaro felt the need to seek legal advice" in his disputes with Prudential, "Miller was 
not among the attorneys practicing in this country eligible to provide that advice." Id at 
28. Likewise, if Spratley and Pearce feel the need to pursue their claims against State 
Farm, Christensen & Jensen is not among the law firms eligible to represent them. 
An additional factor compelled disqualification Given all the facts, it is 
reasonable to assume that Spratley and Pearce will continue disclosing State Farm's 
confidences to Christensen & Jensen, and that no preventative measures will be capable 
of curing the consequences. This factor should weigh in favor of disqualification. "No 
person is immune from the spread of infection by reason of his good conduct or pure 
heart." Goldenberg v. Corporate Air, Inc., 457 A.2d 296, 301 (Conn. 1983) 
(disqualifying counsel notwithstanding counsel's proper conduct). "'[E]ven the most 
rigorous self-discipline might not prevent a lawyer from unconsciously using or 
manipulating a confidence acquired in an earlier representation and transforming it into a 
telling advantage in the subsequent litigation.'" MMR/Wallace Power & Industrial, Inc. 
v. Thames Assoc, 764 F. Supp. 712, 719 (D. Conn. 1991) (citation omitted). See also 
Hull, 513 F.2d at 572. "To believe [the disclosing party] did not and will not remember 
and ultimately use that information, even 'subliminally,' defies common sense and 
human nature." Cordv v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 584 (D. N.J. 1994). 
Christensen & Jensen is engaged in a range of litigation against State Farm, much of 
which involves issues at the core of Spratley and Pearce's suit, and much of which 
involves issues about which Spratley and Pearce necessarily have confidential or 
privileged information due to their more than ten years service with State Farm. It is hard 
to imagine a situation more likely to produce continued breaches of confidentiality to the 
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detriment of State Farm and more likely to make a mockery of the confidential relations 
between lawyers and their clients. 
The second prong of the Cade test is met. Spratley and Pearce have disclosed 
privileged information to Christensen & Jensen and likely will do so in the future. 
D. Christensen & Jensen's Continued Representation Threatens to Taint 
all Further Proceedings in this Case 
The third Cade factor is "whether, in light of such disclosure, opposing counsel's 
'continued representation . . . threatens to "taint" all further proceedings in this case.' " 
956 P.2d at 1081. Since the Complaint cannot be proven without resort to confidential 
and/or privileged information, Christensen & Jensen's continued representation of 
Spratley and Pearce will inevitably taint all further proceedings in this case. Beyond that, 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce are now in the business of suing State Farm. In a website 
designed to attract clients and referrals they advertised their inside knowledge of State 
Farm's practices—knowledge gained as "the top two in-house attorneys for State Farm 
Insurance in Utah." They offered to provide State Farm's adversaries with "their keen 
and fresh insights into the inner workings of State Farm." (R. 264-65). Spratley and 
Pearce's insights into State Farm's workings are "keen and fresh" because these insights 
derive from confidential or privileged information. 
They have now passed some of their "insights" to Christensen & Jensen. They 
have turned this case into an indirect vehicle for Christensen & Jensen's discovery 
privileged information of use in other cases—compromising the integrity of these 
proceedings, as well as those. In these other cases, Christensen & Jensen will have the 
benefit of Spratley and Pearce's knowledge gained from privileged communications. For 
example, in Mosier ex rel Lone Tree Services, Inc. v. State Farm, Christensen & Jensen 
challenges State Farm's litigation of claims, including allegations that State Farm 
unreasonably refused to settle claims. In Fidel v. State Farm, Christensen & Jensen has 
filed memoranda with the court asserting contentions that directly involve the 
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relationship between State Farm's claims practices and its litigation practices. The firm 
contends on plaintiffs behalf that that State Farm's counsel acted improperly and in bad 
faith in relation to the arbitration of an unde[insured motorist claim. In a direct parallel 
with an important issue in this case, Christensen & Jensen also challenges State Farm's 
"peace of mind" policy in handling excess verdict claims. In the Green case, Christensen 
& Jensen has requested both documentary and oral discovery from State Farm's counsel 
regarding claims practices. Although State Farm has so far been able to restrict 
Christensen & Jensen's ability to obtain such information through protective measures, 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce provide Christensen & Jensen with a means of 
circumventing such restrictions. 
The case law presents analogous situations in which courts have found the 
potential for "taint" sufficient to require disqualification. In Williams v. TWA, 588 F. 
Supp. 1037, 1043 (D. Mo. 1984), a plaintiff brought a discrimination claim against his 
former employer, TWA. The plaintiff retained counsel who also represented other parties 
in a separate discrimination claim against TWA. In this other discrimination claim, the 
former employee had assisted TWA's counsel and had been privy to confidential lawyer-
client communications. See id. at 1039. While employed with TWA, the former 
employee prepared "a frank and candid analysis" of the discrimination claim against 
TWA. IcL When TWA discovered that, in pursuing her own discrimination claim, the 
former employee had retained an attorney who was representing plaintiffs adverse to 
TWA in another discrimination claim, TWA moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' counsel. 
See id. at 1040. In granting this motion, the court concluded that the plaintiffs counsel's 
representation of the former employee threatened to taint the entire proceeding: 
[T]he potential for unfair discovery of information through 
private consultation rather than through normal discovery 
procedures threatens the integrity of the trial process... . A 
reasonable member of the public or of the bar would share . . . 
the nagging suspicion that plaintiffs' trial preparation and 
presentation of their cases had benefited from confidential 
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information . . . . All further proceedings in this case, 
including any trial, would be tainted by this reasonable 
suspicion. 
IdLatl045. 
Under similar circumstances, the court in MMR/Wallace Power & Industrial Inc. 
v. Thames Assoc, 764 F. Supp. 712 (D. Conn. 1991), disqualified an attorney due to his 
improper access to the opposing party's confidences. In representing the defendant, the 
disqualified attorney consulted with Richard Willett, a former employee of the plaintiff, 
MMR. Before leaving MMR, Willet had assisted its attorneys in litigation against the 
defendant and "prepared a number of reports and analyses . . . attended and participated 
in a number of confidential meetings with [MMR's] counsel to discuss litigation tactics 
and strategies." IdL The defendant's counsel became aware of Willett's role in the case 
when MMR designated Willett as a potential witness. See id. at 715 nn. 2-3. When 
MMR moved to disqualify the defendant's counsel, the court ruled that his continued 
representation "threatens to taint the integrity of this case because the confidential 
information he presumably received from Willett creates at least an appearance that 
defendant has obtained an unfair advantage at trial." Id at 727. The court noted that 
"[e]ven if, as defendant maintains, no confidential information was actually disclosed, 
[disqualified counsel's] alliance with Willett creates a 'nagging suspicion' that [the 
defendant's] preparation and presentation has already been unfairly benefited." Id. 
"While the court is concerned about interfering with [the] right to freely select counsel of 
its choice, that concern is outweighed by MMR's interest in a trial free from the risk that 
confidential information has been used against i t . . . " Id. at 72 8.24 
The present case presents more than a "nagging suspicion" that Christensen & 
Jensen's presentation of this and other cases will be "unfairly benefited" by confidential 
and/or privileged information improperly disclosed to them; it presents the real potential 
24
 The Utah Court of Appeals relied on the MMR case in articulating disqualification 
standards in Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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for subversion of the litigation process in a number of cases. Disqualification is the only 
appropriate remedy. 
Messrs. Spratley and Pearce rely on Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 89 
Cal.App.4th 294 (2001), a case in which Fox, the employer, moved to disqualify the 
attorneys retained by its employee, Paladino, "on the grounds they had previously 
represented Fox and they had a conflict of interest with their current client, Paladino." Id. 
at 300. To support this claim, Fox offered a series of hypotheticals under which conflicts 
of interest might arise, which the court rejected. See id. at 302. In the present case, by 
contrast, State Farm does not claim that disqualification is necessary due to a conflict of 
interest, real or hypothetical. Rather, disqualification is necessary because Christensen & 
Jensen has obtained improper access to privileged information that Christensen & Jensen 
can use to State Farm's disadvantage in this and other cases. 
Although denying disqualification, the Paladino court cautioned that the risk of 
disclosure of privileged information is a key concern in addressing the propriety of an in-
house counsel's suit against her former employer. See 89 Cal.App.4th 309. Unlike 
Christensen & Jensen, Paladino's attorneys were not simultaneously pursuing other 
claims against Fox. Spratley and Pearce's claims guarantee the disclosure of privileged 
information, and their choice of counsel maximizes the risk of prejudice to State Farm in 
the making of such disclosures. 
Finally, Paladino was an intermediate appellate court's interpretation of principles 
announced by the California Supreme Court in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994). These principles remain intact: in-house counsel may 
only pursue a claim against their employer "provided it can be established without 
breaching the attorney-client privilege or unduly endangering the values lying at the heart 
of the professional relationship." IdL at 490. When such a claim "cannot, for reasons 
peculiar to the particular case, be fully established without breaching the attorney-client 
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privilege, the suit must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the privilege." Id. at 
503-04. 
It is significant that Spratley and Pearce do not attempt to distinguish the case 
most comparable to this case—Prudential Insurance Co. v. Massaro, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11985 (D. N.J. 2000), affd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14560 (3rd Cir. July 18, 
2002). As in this case, Massaro "involve[d] an attorney who [became] the client of 
counsel for the other side." (R. 584, 607). The court held that disqualified counsel's 
access to the opposing party's confidential and privileged information tainted the 
proceedings. See 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11985 **10-11. We respectfully submit that 
this court should reach the same conclusion here. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's Order imposed a necessary set of ground rules to protect 
privileged and other protected information. The Order was necessary because Messrs. 
Spratley and Pearce removed confidential records when they left State Farm's 
employment, then disclosed the records in violation of their duties, claiming all the while 
that they are exempt from the normal rules that lawyers are bound to follow. The Order 
prevents further violations of attorney-client confidences in this unusual case. The Order 
also correctly recognized that disqualifying Christensen & Jensen is the only means of 
ensuring that this case did not turn into an illicit discovery mechanism in other cases. 
Nothing in the Order prevents the plaintiffs from seeking discovery of information 
from State Farm or the other defendants in the ordinary course of litigation under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It only prevents further misuse of confidential and/or 
privileged information, and takes steps to remedy those abuses. 
The Order should be affirmed. 
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DATED this % day of September, 2002. 
Snell & Wilmer 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Scott C. Sandberg 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY and BRETT G. 
PEARCE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHAEL 
ARNOLD, CRAIG KINGMAN, SCOTT D. 
KOTTER and HAROLD E. NIXON, 
Defendants. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY and BRETT G. 
PEARCE, 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 010904770 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Court Clerk: Cindy Beverly 
December 7, 2001 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to State Farm's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Protective Order, Motion to 
Disqualify, and Motion to Strike Cohen Affidavit. The Court heard 
oral argument with respect to the motions on December 3, 2001. 
Following the hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Turning first to State Farm's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Protective Order, after reviewing the relevant case 
law, it is clear the majority of jurisdictions hold an attorney 
hired by an insurance company to defend its insured represents the 
insurer, absent any conflict of interest, in something akin to 
"dual client status." In the instant case, both Richard Spratley 
and Brett Pearce were hired to provide legal services for State 
Farm and State Farm insureds. Indeed, they were, in effect, in-
house counsel. While neither side disputes that the primary duty, 
when an attorney is hired to provide a defense under an insurance 
policy, is to the insured, the Court finds, and the case law 
supports, that such does not necessarily limit the ability of the 
insurer to assert attorney-client privilege. 
Based upon the forgoing, Messrs. Spratley and Pearce are 
ordered to: 
(1) Refrain from disclosing (in this litigation or 
otherwise) confidential communications and 
information exchanged between Spratley or Pearce on 
one hand, and State Farm and/or its insureds on the 
other hand, relating to the provision of legal 
services by Spratley, Pearce or other lawyers for 
State Farm, or made for the purpose of facilitating 
such legal services; 
(2) Refrain from disclosing any facts relating to 
Spratley or Pearcers representation of State Farm's 
insureds, absent express consent to disclosure by 
the insureds; and 
(3) Return to State Farm all confidential documents 
materials, and information that Spratley and Pearce 
created, maintained, or acquired as part of their 
employment with State Farm, and that are currently 
in their possession. 
With respect to State Farm's Motion to Disqualify: 
In deciding a motion to disqualify for breach 
of confidentiality, courts have considered: 
(1) whether the disclosing party had 
"confidential or privileged information 
pertaining to [the movant's] trial preparation 
and strategy"; (2) whether the disclosing 
party disclosed that information to opposing 
counsel; and (3) whether, in light of such 
disclosure, opposing counsel's "continued 
representation . . . threatens to 'taint' all 
further proceedings in this case." 
Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1081 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)(internal citations omitted). 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is 
uncontroverted plaintiffs' role while at State Farm was to act as 
legal counsel advising State Farm directly and representing State 
Farm's insureds. Moreover, inherent in such an attorney-client 
relationship is engaging in confidential communications as to 
litigations strategies. In sum, plaintiffs acted as lawyers, and 
in that capacity engaged in confidential communications, thus 
satisfying the first element of Cade. 
As to the remaining elements, it is undisputed plaintiffs have 
already divulged privileged information concerning State Farm's 
litigations strategies to Mr. Humphreys and his firm. Furthermore, 
additional disclosure seems a virtual certainty as such is 
necessary to support their allegations. Finally, the Court is 
persuaded that under the circumstances, these continued disclosures 
threaten to taint all further proceedings in this case. 
In sum, while motions to disqualify are to be viewed with 
extreme caution, because privileged communications are the 
centerpiece of this case, the Court is of the opinion 
disqualification, as requested by defendants, is appropriate. 
Finally, with respect to the Cohen Affidavit, the Court finds 
such lacks foundation and offers impermissible legal opinions. 
Accordingly, the affidavit is stricken. 
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the matters 
addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this M-^day of December, 2001. 
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Exhibit A 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES 
Copr. © West Group 2002. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 3-15-2002. 
RULE 504. LAWYER-CLIENT 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, 
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is 
rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with 
a view to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client 
to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in 
a rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on 
behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the 
lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of 
representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and the client's 
representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the 
professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably 
necessary for the transmission ofthe communication. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client between the client and the client's 
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing 
others in matters of common interest, and among the client's representatives, 
lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters 
of common interest, in any combination. 
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(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, 
the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased 
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, 
association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person 
who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought 
or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client 
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant 
to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, 
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by 
inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. As to a communication relevant to an 
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the 
lawyer; or 
(4) Document Attested by Lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or 
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common 
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of 
them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action 
between any of the clients. 
Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would 
replace and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) and is intended to be consistent with the 
ethical obligations of confidentiality set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
The Committee revised the proposed rule of the United States Supreme Court 
to address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 
101 S.Ct. 677 (1981), as to when communications involving representatives of 
a corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected 
limiting the privilege to members of the "control group" and added as 
subparagraph (a)(4) a definition for "representative of the client" that 
includes within the privilege disclosures not only of the client and the 
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client's formal spokesperson, but also employees who are specifically 
authorized to communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word 
"specifically" is intended to preclude a general authorization from the 
client for the client's employees to communicate under the cloak of the 
privilege, but is intended to allow the client, as related to a specific 
matter, to authorize the client's employees as "representatives" to disclose 
information to the lawyer as to that specific matter with confidence that the 
disclosures will remain within the lawyer-client privilege. 
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be directly paid by thelawyer as 
long as the representative meets the requirement of being engaged to assist 
the lawyer in providing legal services. Thus, a person paid directly by the 
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the 
purposes of providing legal services satisfies the requirements of 
subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of the client who may be an 
independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or 
person providing other services, is a representative of the client for 
purposes of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide 
services reasonably related to the subject matter of the legal services or 
whose service is necessary to provide such service. 
The client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential 
communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or others who 
were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the 
client, the content of the confidential communication. Problems of waiver 
are dealt with by Rule 507. 
Under subparagraph (b) communications among the various people involved in 
the legal matter, relating to the providing of legal services, are all 
privileged, except for communications between clients. Those are privileged 
only if they are part of a conference with others involved in legal services. 
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, trustee, or similar representative 
of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in 
existence" to claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of 
several persons has claims to the rights of a previously existing entity, the 
court will be required to determine from the facts which entity's claim is 
most consistent with the purposes of this rule. 
The Committee considered and rejected an exception to the rule for 
communications in furtherance of a tort. Disallowing the privilege where the 
lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent 
with the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the 
exception to include "intentional torts," but concluded that because of the 
broad range of conduct that may be found to be an intentional tort, such an 
exception would create undesirable ambiguities and uncertainties as to when 
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the privilege applies. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically 
enumerated, and further endorsed the concept that in the area of exceptions, 
the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than 
expressing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The 
Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts 
of "waiver." 
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Exhibit B 
WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES 
Copr. © West Group 2002. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 3-15-2002. 
RULE 507. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of 
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or 
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents 
to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or 
fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule 
does not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not 
admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclosure was 
(1) compelled erroneously or 
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. 
(c)(1) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of privilege, whether 
in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of 
comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(2) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. Injury cases, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making 
of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury. 
(3) Jury Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might 
draw an adverse inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to 
instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not 
apply when the privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked. 
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Advisory Committee Note 
The subject matter of Rule 507 was previously included in Utah Rules of 
Evidence 37, 38, 39 and 40. The language recommended by the 
Committee, however, is largely that of proposed Federal Rules 511,512 and 
513, rules not included among those adopted by Congress. 
Proposed Federal Rule 511 became Rule 507(a), replacing Rule 37. 
Proposed Federal Rule 512 became Rule 507(b), replacing Rule 38. Proposed 
Federal Rule 513 became Rule 507(c), replacing Rule 39. No replacement 
was adopted for Rule 40 since the Committee determined that the subject 
matter of that rule need not be covered by a rule of evidence. 
Subparagraph (a). Since the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the 
protection of some societal interest or confidential relationship, the 
privilege should end when the purpose is no longer served because the holder 
of the privilege has allowed disclosure or made disclosure. For the same 
reason, although Rule 37 required a knowing waiver of the privilege, Rule 
507(a) as drafted does not require such knowledge. A stranger to the 
communication may testify to an otherwise privileged communication, if the 
participants have failed to take reasonable precautions to preserve privacy. 
Subparagraph (b). Once disclosure of privileged matter has occurred, although confidentiality 
cannot be restored, the purpose of the privilege may 
still be served in some instances by preventing use of the evidence against 
the holder of the privilege. For that reason, privileged matter may still be 
excluded when the disclosure was not voluntary or was made without an 
opportunity to claim the privilege. 
Subparagraph (c). 
(1) Allowing inferences to be drawn from the invocation of a privilege might undermine the 
interest or relationship the privilege was designed to 
protect. 
(2) For the same reason, the invocation of a privilege should not be 
revealed to the jury. Doing so might also result in unwarranted emphasis on 
the exclusion of the privileged matter. 
(3) Whether to seek an instruction is left to the judgment of counsel for 
the party against whom the inference might be drawn. If requested, such an 
instruction is a matter of right. 
(4) The provisions of subparagraph (c)(4) are not intended to alter the 
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common law rules as to inferences that may be drawn or as to when a party may comment or be 
entitled to a jury instruction when the privilege has been 
invoked. 
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Exhibit C 
WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART V. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY 
Copr. © West Group 2002. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 3-15-2002. 
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and 
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without 
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or 
defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the 
information; 
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
discoverable documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the 
possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or 
defenses, unless solely for impeachment; 
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing 
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all 
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such 
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of 
injuries suffered; and 
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement 
under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to 
satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after 
the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated 
by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the 
parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A party 
shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably 
available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not 
fully completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges 
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the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has not 
made disclosures. 
(2) Exemptions. 
(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply 
to actions: 
(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is 
$20,000 or less; 
(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making 
proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(vi) in which any party not admitted to the practice law in Utah is not 
represented by counsel. 
(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart 
(a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who 
may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 
705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected 
to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is 
expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored 
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid 
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
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(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after 
the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the 
evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same 
subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 
days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the 
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other 
than solely for impeachment: 
(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone 
number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to 
present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be 
presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a 
transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, 
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the 
party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need 
arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days 
before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified 
by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections 
to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, 
that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under 
subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under 
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived 
unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall 
be made in writing, signed and served. 
(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by 
one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or 
written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things 
or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other 
purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
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(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection 
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
(2) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set 
forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines 
that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the 
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of 
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and 
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon 
its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under 
Subdivision (c). 
(3) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision 
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or 
by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the 
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the 
preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering 
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court 
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party 
concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the 
action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a 
person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If 
the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The provisions 
of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
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motion For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a 
wntten statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making 
it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a 
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral 
statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded 
(4) Trial preparation Experts 
(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert 
whose opinions may be presented at trial If a report is required under 
subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after 
the report is provided 
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has 
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of 
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a 
witness at tnal, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other 
means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(1) The courtshall require that the party seeking discovery pay the 
expert a reasonable fee for time spent m responding to discovery under 
Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, and 
(n) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(A) of 
this rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained 
under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party 
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and 
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and 
opinions from the expert 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has m good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties m an effort 
to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the 
court m which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a 
deposition, the court m the district where the deposition is to be taken may 
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one 
or more of the following 
(1) that the discovery not be had, 
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(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, 
including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than 
that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated 
by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated 
way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under 
subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise 
stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party may not seek 
discovery from any source before the parties have met and conferred as required 
by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by 
the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first 
answer is filed. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of 
discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting 
discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any 
other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under 
subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is 
under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information 
thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances: 
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals 
disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material 
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respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the 
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the 
other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision 
(a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to information contained in the report and to 
information provided through a deposition ofthe expert. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an 
interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if the party 
learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect 
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made 
known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order. 
(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement ofthe 
action, meet in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their 
claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement ofthe action, 
to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), and to 
develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the 
meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall 
attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(2) The plan shall include: 
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for 
disclosures under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when 
disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made; 
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be 
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether 
discovery should be limited to particular issues; 
(C) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed 
under these rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; and 
(D) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the 
meeting and in any event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a 
proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery 
plan. The proposed form of order shall also include each ofthe subjects listed 
in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, 
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final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be 
deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to 
the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any 
party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on which 
the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the 
presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not included 
within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order 
under Rule 16(b). 
(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the 
stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on 
stipulation or motion a modification of the discover/ plan and order. The 
stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request 
for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed 
by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is not 
represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature of the attorney or 
party constitutes a certification that the person has read the request, 
response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent 
with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had 
in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to 
the attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a 
party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is 
signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the 
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is 
made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including 
a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action 
or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person within 
this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and 
limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, 
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provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such 
deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which 
the person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and 
provided further that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition 
which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted 
to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures 
or requests for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original 
certificate of service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery 
have been served on the other parties and the date of service. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of 
service stating that the response has been served on the other parties and the 
date of service. Except as provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 
37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the 
response which is at issue. 
[Amended November 1, 1999; April 1, 2000; November 1, 2000.] 
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RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after 
consultation. 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes 
necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that 
the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or 
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another; 
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in 
the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used; 
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client or to establish a defense to a criminal 
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client 
was involved; or 
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
(c) Representation of a client includes counseling a lawyer(s) about the need 
for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or psychological or 
emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving on the Lawyers 
Helping Lawyers Committee. 
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Comment 
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the 
lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the 
representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and 
frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject 
matter. 
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of 
law, the attorney-client privilege in the law of evidence and the rule of 
confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client 
privilege applies injudicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be 
called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a 
client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations 
other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion 
of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated 
in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the 
representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such 
information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. 
Authorized Disclosure 
A lawyer may disclose information about a client when necessary in the 
proper representation of the client. In litigation, for example, a lawyer 
may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be 
disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a 
satisfactory conclusion. 
Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to 
each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client 
has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. 
Disclosure Adverse to Client 
The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming 
privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client 
intends serious and perhaps irreparable harm to another person. To the 
extent a lawyer is prohibited from making disclosure, the interests of the 
potential victim are sacrificed in favor of preserving the client's 
confidences even though the client's purpose is wrongful. To the extent a 
lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client 
may be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to 
counsel against a wrongful course of action. A rule governing disclosure of 
threatened harm thus involves balancing the interests of one group of 
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potential victims against those of another. On the assumption that lawyers 
generally fulfill their duty to advise against the commission of deliberately 
wrongful acts, the public is better protected if full disclosure by the 
client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. 
Generally speaking, information relating to the representation must be kept 
confidential, as stated in paragraph (a). However, where the client is or 
has been engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct or the integrity of the 
lawyer's own conduct is involved, the principle of confidentiality may have 
to yield, depending on the lawyer's knowledge about and relationship to the 
conduct in question and the seriousness of that conduct. Several situations 
must be distinguished. 
First, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in conduct that is 
criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). As noted in the Comment to that 
Rule, there can be situations where the lawyer may have to reveal information 
relating to the representation in order to avoid assisting a client's 
criminal or fraudulent conduct. Paragraph 1.6(b)(4) permits doing so. 
Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3(a)(4) not to use false or 
fabricated evidence. This duty is essentially a special instance of the duty 
prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct. Rule 1.6(b)(4) permits revealing information to the 
extent necessary to comply with Rule 3.3(a). The same is true of compliance 
with Rule 4.1 concerning truthfulness of a lawyer's own representations. 
Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the 
client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation, the lawyer has 
not violated Rule 1.2(d), because to "counsel or assist" criminal or 
fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. 
Even if the involvement was innocent, however, the fact remains that the 
lawyer's professional services were made the instrument of the client's crime 
or fraud. The lawyer, therefore, has a legitimate interest in being able to 
rectify the consequences of such conduct and has the professional right, 
although not a professional duty, to rectify the situation. Exercising that 
right may require revealing information relating to the representation. 
Paragraph (b)(2) gives the lawyer professional discretion to reveal such 
information to the extent necessary to accomplish rectification. 
Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that 
is criminal or fraudulent. Inaction by the lawyer is not a violation of Rule 
1.2(d), except in the limited circumstances where failure to act constitutes 
assisting the client. See Comment to Rule 1.2(d). However, the lawyer's 
knowledge of the client's purpose may enable the lawyer to prevent commission 
of the prospective crime or fraud. If the prospective crime or fraud is 
likely to result in substantial injury, the lawyer may feel a moral 
obligation to take preventive action. When the threatened injury is grave, 
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such as homicide or serious bodily injury, the lawyer may have an obligation 
under tort or criminal law to take reasonable preventive measures. Whether 
the lawyer's concern is based on moral or legal considerations, the interest 
in preventing the harm may be more compelling than the interest in preserving 
confidentiality of information relating to the client. As stated in 
paragraph (b)(1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal 
information in order to prevent substantial harm likely to result from a 
client's criminal or fraudulent act. 
It is arguable that the lawyer should have a professional obligation to 
make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which 
the lawyer knows is intended by a client. However, it is very difficult for 
a lawyer to "know" when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, 
for the client may have a change of mind. To require disclosure when the 
client intends such an act, at risk of disciplinary liability if the 
assessment of the client's purpose turns out to be wrong, would be to impose 
a penal risk that might interfere with the lawyer's resolution of an 
inherently difficult moral dilemma. 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors 
as the magnitude, proximity and likelihood of the contemplated wrong, the 
nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might 
be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and 
factors that may extenuate the conduct in question In any case, a 
disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the 
lawyer believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take 
preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1) does not violate this Rule. 
The term "another" in paragraph (b)(1) includes a person, organization and 
government. 
Paragraph (b)(2) does not apply where a lawyer is employed after a crime of 
fraud has been committed to represent the client in matters ensuing 
therefrom. 
Dispute Concerning Lawyer's Conduct 
If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is 
implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from 
defending himself. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or 
professional disciplinary proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly 
committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third 
person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer 
and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is not prevented by 
the rule of confidentiality from proving the services rendered in an action 
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to collect it. 
Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized 
The attorney-client privilege is defined differently in various 
jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony 
concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, Rule 1.6(a) requires the 
lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or 
require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See 
Rules 1.13, 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer 
may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information 
about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a 
matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules, but a presumption 
should exist against such a supersession. 
Use of Information 
A lawyer may not make use of information relating to the representation in 
a manner disadvantageous to the client. The duty of confidentiality 
continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9. 
C \Rules and Regs doc c 
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PREAMBLE. A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. Every 
lawyer is responsible to observe the law and the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
shall take the Attorney's Oath upon admission to the practice of law, and shall 
be subject to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As 
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the 
client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical 
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position 
under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result 
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing 
with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their 
divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson 
for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. A lawyer's 
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not 
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral 
views or activities. 
In all professional functions, a lawyer should be competent, prompt and 
diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the 
representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to 
representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal 
affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes 
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for 
the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers 
and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge 
the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal 
process. 
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As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the 
administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate 
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in 
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be 
mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that 
the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal 
assistance and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in 
their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these 
objectives and should help the Bar regulate itself in the public interest. 
A lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of 
professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of 
skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal 
profession's ideal of public service. 
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the 
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an 
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on 
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done. So 
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves 
the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and 
thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications will 
be private. 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are 
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict 
between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the 
lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a 
satisfactory living. Within the framework of these Rules, many difficult issues 
of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the 
exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules. 
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions 
also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is 
unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession 
and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is 
manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is 
vested largely in the courts. 
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional 
calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation 
also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government 
domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving 
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government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged 
by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to 
practice. 
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special 
responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to 
assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in 
furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the Bar. Not only is 
every lawyer responsible for observing the Rules of Professional Conduct, but 
the lawyer should also aid in securing observance of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the 
independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. 
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of 
this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our 
legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve 
to define that relationship. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 24. WITNESSES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 4th Special Session 
78-24-8 Privileged communications. 
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to 
encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot 
be examined as a witness in the following cases: 
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either during the marriage or 
afterwards be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any 
communication made by one to the other during the marriage. 
(b) This exception does not apply: 
(I) to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse against the other; 
( n ) to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one 
spouse against the other; 
( m ) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to support a spouse or 
child; 
(IV) to any civil or criminal proceeding for abuse or neglect committed 
against the child of either spouse; or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by law. 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as 
to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given regarding 
the communication in the course of his professional employment. An 
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be examined, without the 
consent of his employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of which has 
been acquired in his capacity as an employee. 
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making 
the confession, be examined as to any confession made to him in his 
professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to 
which he belongs. 
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(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be 
examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the 
patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the 
patient. However, this privilege shall be deemed to be waived by the patient 
in an action in which the patient places his medical condition at issue as 
an element or factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a 
physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that patient for the 
medical condition at issue may provide information, interviews, reports, 
records, statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's 
medical condition and treatment which are pLaced at issue. 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in 
official confidence when the public interests would suffer by the 
disclosure. 
(6) A sexual assault counselor as defined in Section 78-3c-3 cannot, 
without the consent of the victim, be examined in a civil or criminal 
proceeding as to any confidential communication as defined in Section 78-3c-
3 made by the victim. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-24-8; L. 1977, ch. 140, § 2; 
1983, ch. 158, § 2; 1984, ch. 17, § 2; 1989, ch. 103, § 1; 1990, ch. 45, § 1. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-24-8 
UT ST § 78-24-8 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Master Docket No. 
95-4704 (AMW) 
MDL No. 1061 (AMW) 
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 
JOEL A. PISANO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE: 
This matter comes before the Court on the cross-motion of-
counsel for The Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential'") to 
sanction and disqualify J. Bruce Miller, Esq. ("Miller"), 
lead/liaison counsel for plaintiff sales agents who have filed 
wrongful termination or retaliation claims against Prudential. 
The matter was referred to the undersigned for Report and 
Recommendation by the Hon. Alfred M. Wolin. 
Miller has filed opposition to Prudential's cross-motion/ 
-and -the-Court -heard-oral-argument-on-February-11,—1997-.—For-the 
reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that 
Prudential's cross-motion to disqualify Miller be granted. 
BACKGROUND 
I. ONGOING MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION 
In February and March of 1995, a number of class action 
lawsuits against Prudential were filed by life insurance 
t 
policyholders alleging a scheme of improper and illegal sales 
practices that continued from the 1980 fs through the early 
1990 !s. (Report of Special Masterfs Investigation at 2.) These 
alleged practices included the sale of vanishing premium 
policies, where the policyholder was told that after he paid a 
certain amount of premiums for a certain period of time the 
policy would be paid in full, but in fact after that time 
additional premiums continued to be due. Another alleged 
practice was known as "churning," or "financed" insurance, where 
an individual's pre-existing policy was used to finance the 
payment of premiums for a new, more expensive policy. This 
practice benefitted the sales agents and managers, who received 
credit and commissions for an additional sale. Customers who had 
built up equity in less expensive policies, however, saw that 
equity depleted as it was used to finance the price difference 
between the old and new policies until the old policy lapsed. 
Yet another alleged scheme involved misrepresenting life 
insurance products as private pension plan, retirement plan, and 
nursing home insurance products. 
One of the individual policyholder suits, Key v. Prudential 
("Key" )-was-tried-to-a~jury-in"Guntersville— -Alabama-in~August-of ~~ 
1995. In that suit the plaintiff alleged fraud in connection 
2 
with a vanishing life insurance policy he had purchased from 
Prudential, When the premiums did not vanish, he sued, the jury 
awarded him $25,000,000, and the case was eventually settled. 
(Transcript of January 30, 1997 Hearing at 21-22, 36.l) Key's 
attorneys were Clay Hornsby ("Hornsby") and Larry Morris 
("Morris") of Morris, Haynes, Ingram & Hornsby, Alexander City, 
Alabama. 
In 1995 another wave of cases against Prudential were filed 
by sales agents who alleged wrongful termination or retaliation 
by Prudential. (Id. at 6.) These cases are related to the 
policyholder cases in that the plaintiff sales agents are 
alleging that the adverse personnel actions taken against them 
were in some way connected with improper sales practices. For 
example, some agents are claiming that they were terminated for 
low sales figures, even though more successful agents who were 
not terminated achieved higher sales only by engaging in illegal 
sales practices. (Id. at 12-14.) 
One of these cases was filed by Rick A. Martin ("Martin") in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky on January 30, 1995. (Id. at 6.) On August 3, 1995, the 
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation transferred all 
actions relating to Prudential sales practices, including all 
class actions, individual actions, and sales agent and 
whistleblower actions (collectively, "MDL"), to the District of 
1
 At this hearing, Mr. Miller and counsel for Prudential 
stipulated to much of the factual background set forth below. 
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New Jersey, Pursuant to the transfer order, all pre-trial 
proceedings were centralized before Judge Wolin. Miller, who was 
Martin's attorney, was appointed lead/liaison counsel for the 
sales agent plaintiffs. (Transcript of January. 30, 1997 Hearing, 
at 6.) 
Presently, there are approximately 20 sales agent cases 
included in the MDL, with Miller counsel of record for four 
plaintiffs, all of whom are former agents of Prudential.2 There 
are approximately 4 0 more sales agent cases pending in state 
courts. Miller also represents four of these plaintiffs3, (Id. 
at 10-11) , and initially served as co-counsel in Rutt v. 
Prudential, which was filed in state court in Pennsylvania, 
(Miller's November 5, 1996 Affidavit at 2 ) / As to all the sales 
agent plaintiffs, in December of 1995 Prudential moved to compel 
arbitration pursuant to agreements signed by their sales agents 
and sales management personnel. Judge Wolin denied the motion, 
holding that the MDL sales agent cases fell within the business 
insurance exception to arbitrability and are not subject to 
mandatory arbitration. (Transcript of January 30, 1997 Hearing at 
17-19.) All the MDL sales agent cases are presently stayed 
pending' Prudential*s appeal to the Third Circuit on this issue. 
2
 These plaintiffs are Rick Martin, Rick Walters, Thomas 
Cerchia, and Paul Maddy. (Miller's November 5, 1996 Affidavit at 
1.) 
3
 These plaintiffs are William Yancey, Thomas Snowdon, Charles 
- Ehling, -and -Niles -Oinonen.—(Miller-' s-November-5,- -19 9 6 -Affidavit- at-
2.) 
4
 In early December, 1996, the feutt case was settled. 
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A recurring theme in lhe MM,, u, "the persistent and 
recurrent destruction of documents" by agents an I employees of 
Prudenti ''1 i 11 the face c: ^f iiti ill t:i ]:: 3 € pc: •] ic '} 1 ic: Iciei: ; n r ,«^ *"i g *.: L"J I. " 
• l a w s u i t i I Vl'i 11 nil (Jin I n I o n o f J a n u a r y 6 199' -at 1 Prudential 
documents have been destroyed in Jacksonville, Florida, 
C - " ••"• -J '* ' Mrinsrirhu.net: 1- n „ TV'1; Mini n ;-«, I •;,! jm/| Uyracu1 M , N M W • 
I i. > : Syracuse, additional materials were "spirited-out of 
Prudential fs office to avoid detection'" by Prudential personnel 
n: i on :i toa : :i ng c :: mp3 i a i :i ::  s i :i tl i • order 
to preser ve all documents . records, (Id. ar i 
Cambridge, between February *-- November 1996, approximately 9000 
c .3 i ent :fi 1 es ei e ,""1 :: •] ea :r: 80 f : >] ciei: s_ c f documents wen : e 
destroyed, (Id. at 4 0 41.) On January 6., 199 7,, Judge Wolin 
ordered Prudential to p a;; ' $] , 000, 000 a n fines for its fa i 1 i ii: e tc: 
ii i iplei i lei it e ., « i : < :: lr = .i it p : es ei ; a t i on poli c> in accordance with the 
Court's document preservation order. Following this order, the 
C o u r t a p p o i n t e d J u s t i n P W a 1 d e r, E s q (" W a 1 \ 5 e i: t!) 
two reported incidents, Pi udential f s allege :3 "withholding : 
memoranda written b;> James C. Keif rich, Esq., ("Helfrich"! ; in- • 
house cr-nsei dt Pruden ",= to) :son ' i 3 1! ;e-; • I loiiuM ol I i. , . d 
allege, ^ r u m p n f d e s t r u _ „ ^ « Michael Bari., Esq, ("Barn l') , a. 
par'r.-r z - ;:•* . :^  * .- "menschei n, Nath & Fosenthal 
("Sonnenbc; - mi | n \{ 
practice? * ^\ ^ ...: . 
In-Ncverrier and December~cr :-92, - Helf rich-wrote-at least-
t . „or management that 
significant number of complaints had been received relating to 
financed insurance sales, and that Prudential needed a plan to 
address and correct the problem. (Wolin Opinion of January 29, 
1997 at 2-3.) After Prudential failed to take action as 
recommended in the memoranda, Helfrich presumably became 
disenchanted with his employment. He eventually negotiated for a 
severance package and left Prudential in July of 1995. 
(Transcript of January 30, 1997 Hearing at 547.} 
In response to a subpoena, Prudential produced the Helfrich 
memoranda to the Florida Attorney General in January of 1996, but 
did not produce the memoranda to the Multi-State Task Force5 
("Task Force") until July 2, 1996, even though in April and May 
of 1996 representatives of the New Jersey Department of 
Insurance, on behalf of the Task Force, orally requested 
Prudential to produce the type of documents that would include 
the Helfrich memoranda. (Wolin Opinion of January 29, 1997 at 4 .) 
The Helfrich memoranda were produced to the Task Force just eight 
days before it was to release a final report addressing 
Prudential management's knowledge of improper sales practices. 
Its report, compiled after 14 months of investigation, concluded 
that senior management should have known about improper sales 
practices as early as 1992, (Id. at 5), and recommended a 
5
 The Multi-State Task Force was formed by the New Jersey 
Department of Insurance and comprises the insurance regulatory 
bodies for 45 states and the District of Columbia. The Task Force 
was-assembled to-investigate-abuses -in- the-marketing-and-sale-6f-
life insurance products by Prudential and other insurance 
companies. 
6 
[>Jbt O'Oij, oui.i J ine and restitution *-~ consumers, (Wall Street 
Journal, July 15, 1996, B9B I r; memoranda had been timely 
prodr -^':1 * Vu T»IJ.1« P> i I'!- * 
defir.-.- finding that Prudential fs .senior management did know 
about improper sales practices. (Wolin Opinion of January.29, 
1 Q Q 7 'if "" ) 
U L September 8,r 1995, Michael Barr, c3 n outside litigation' 
attorney for Prudential, shredded a number of• documents a t 
T'rn 1fjnt" i .'i I ' ; '* a r tin: lent i i i 3 ackS' : i IV :i 1 ] e F 1 • :: :i : i • ::ic i (Fi e .p ::>x t c f 
Special Master't investigation at 5.) In fact, the shredding 
: : o; pl:^ -: rh<: office formerly occupied K v Helfrich, which was 
Massaro, 
. . , ^"Massaro1 -house counsel ir Prudential 
~---^r - > ffic? former c " '' -1 *' Helfrich ti.ll._. «pit-
. ~i . aeluding the taking 
; .fc>: ceposiriorc, ** Special Master concluded that the 
- - :-er~ rhredded were excess phot * 
. .--- . . rumpnt^ w ^ ^n ^r>-r jdgment because _•: was 
understandably n;i t interpreted i ;. -tliers :: - ;\ : r ^ r : L u : e an 
-r,ru:':; :-r. :: : justice f 
- .:::*-
:
:.'.. -* :.,"-,. - • _. L_ ^  > . : -. violation c; i, ne 
- :les c:' Prof essic:..-.': \;: :.: n::. \lf . .:..":: ; 1 . • 
As L U Lhc riexi; - - ,.wit 
^t was produced 5^ - timely mannei L tr.e Florida At;t::r:v:y 
-General v.d Department, of - Insurance u,.:-t srTjld h?ve-been-earl ~ r*r-
4 ^ - ;• .'.-j-^r's 
7 
Report was adopted in its entirety by order of Judge Wolin on 
January 29, 1997. 
From this complex progression of events, two subplots emerge 
to dictate Millerfs fate in the cross-motion presently before the 
Court- These are, in chronological order, first, the giving of 
testimony by Rick Martin, one of the sales agent plaintiffs 
represented by Miller, during Key v. Prudential, and, second, 
Miller's representation of John Massaro, who sought his advice in 
December of 1996 regarding his concerns over Barr's document 
destruction and the withholding by Prudential of the Helfrich 
memoranda. 
II. MARTIN'S TESTIMONY IN KEY V, PRUDENTIAL 
Rick Martin was a District Manager of the Paducah, Kentucky 
District at Prudential until his employment was terminated in 
1992. (Transcript of January 30, 1997 Hearing at 23-) Thereafter 
he was unable to find comparable work, and in May of 1992 
accepted employment as a mobile home salesperson at a salary of 
$12,000 per year. (Miller Deposition at 28.) 
Miller commenced representation of Martin in February of 
1953, (Miller Letter to Martin of February 12, 1993), and filed 
suit on 'his behalf in January of 1995. 
Sometime during the spring of 1995, Hornsby and his law firm 
learned of Martin1s lawsuit and determined that they wanted to 
present his testimony in the Key case. Miller has suggested that 
-their- -interest-may-have -been-piqued-by-an-article -published—in 
Newsweek magazine, which mentioned Martin's suit. (Miller 
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Deposition at 99.) " Letters and phone calls were exchanged,6 and 
on July ?.s iQ9r«, Mi 1 ] er 'drove frnn' i nipcv > 1 ! < i IMM m I , i 
IJCILII i i li M iiiit'bLif t MM i Line to meet Mailiui fox dii fajOO a.m. 
breakfast meeting at the Marriott Hotel, Then they drove to a 
conference r<-r.r «r *-' - airport, when 1 '•lvv rr.Pt H.irnr.^j iv jrris 
s.JuJ table financial arrangement could be . 
made z:. - " *. Martin would testify the Key case, {Transcr r" of 
January 3 0, 1997 Heariir r 
,*._ agreements ;vferred 
!•=::;:, £ ' cCimony . "exper: testimon; J- r. - signed :?r r^  a 
Tn<=»^t- ,. . , groups 
Killer an" ''!':::; agreed :; financial -rangements and terms 
ana cona; ^ ... ^ cussed . a 
content c ,_.:.. t£..iin:; Miller a::: Morris agreed that 
Martin would be p a i d a n initial fen of ?7,500 7 and Millar1;. I i mi 
wou I 11 I'M 11 MI HI in if i i I li11 1 '  111,111111 (J'L. at 41 I1 Miller has 
6
 A fair reading of the letters is that Miller functioned as 
cut agent brokering Martin's testimony. Martin is not denoted an 
expert in the letters written prior to July 3, 1995, See Letter 
-from Hornsby to Miller of May 26, 1995 ("We would sure like to use 
Mr, Martin as a witness as it concerns his experience at Prudential 
regarding the pressure to sell and selling vanishing premium on 
'paid-up1 variable life insurance policies."") (emphasis: added) . 
See also Letter from Hornsby to Miller of May 30, 1995 ("It would 
be a -huge help to our case if Rick A, Martin could come live and . 
testify. We would be able to reimburse hir frr -11 his expenses 
including time off from work."). 
7
 This fee was based on a rate of $100" per hour, so "that if 
— Mart in- -spent—more— than— 75 —hours -preparing -for— and -giving—his -
testimony, he would'have been paid $100 for each additional hour, 
but if he spent less than" 75 hours, he would not have to refund any 
of the $7,500. (Miller Deposition at 295-297.) 
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characterized the $10,000 payment as a "signing bonus." (Id. at 
87.) Financial arrangements were not further discussed once the 
four men reconvened at the end of the morning. (Hornsby 
Deposition at 73.) Thereafter, a number of discussions regarding 
the content of Martin's Key testimony took place between Martin 
and Miller, between Martin and Denis Fleming ("Fleming"), then an 
associate working for Miller/ and between Fleming and Hornsby. 
(Transcript of January 30, 1997 Hearing at 44.) 
The agreed upon funds were deposited by Miller into a 
trustee account on August 11, 1995, and on August 17, 1995 Miller 
wrote a check from the trustee account to Martin in the amount of 
$7,500. Martin deposited the $7,500 check into his account on 
August 22, 1995. (Id. at 68.) Thereafter, Miller used part of 
the $10,000 payment to his firm to pay expenses associated with 
the prosecution of Martin's case against Prudential. (Id. at 72-
73.) The Hornsby-Morris firm cut a third check, dated December 
29, 1995 and made payable to the Miller Law Group, in the amount 
of $8,587 for legal services rendered. (Transcript of December 2, 
1996 Hearing at 15.) 
Miller was not present during Martin's testimony in the Key 
case August 23, 1995. On that day he was in St. Louis conducting 
depositions in an entirely unrelated matter. (Miller Deposition 
at 61.) Miller's associate, Mr. Fleming, accompanied Martin to 
Guntersville but left the courtroom just before Martin took the 
st and. _(Hornsby_ Deposit ion . at._120-121. )_Millerls -explanation -for— 
Fleming1s absence is that Hornsby and Morris preferred to have 
10 
u i i h ; l o c i ' 1 ",f 1 ' , " , u ' " ,mi * ] i p i i . i i i i l l "liuif i i i ' j U t i i L . n i ' R 
testimony, re r^i::^ as great a contrast as -possible between Mr. 
Keyf s anc P r u d e n t r - - ' : +~A n a t i o n s teamr , (Mil 1 e i• Depo n i t i 11\ i 
62 6 . / eve r , t l la t 1 lar t i n n e v e r s u b m i t t e d 
an e x p e r t r e p o r t , was n e v e r q u a l i f i e d a s an e x p e r t and, in f a c t , 
g a v e o n l y . f a c t w i t n e s s ' t e s t i m o n y r e l a t ;i ng t o h i e ' ypen i nnr r . a 
F i i idei ltd a 3 age i i t 1 la :i t ::i i i" s e n t i r e t e s t i m o n y c o v e i c 3 9 pages ot 
"'the Key t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t -and t o o k les i - LXLV :ne h o u r . (Hornsby 
D e p o s i t ! on a t 15B . ) He was n o t asked L : 
not:i i:i i ig 1 ie sa :i ci cou.J cl even r e m o t e l y ' b e u.* - . .,; e r i z e a u~ e x p e r t 
t e s t i m o n y . 
. Martin"" t e s t i f i e d * 
f i n a n c i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s i . u , *._; ^>>_ ^ -^ -.. connect- .c . . * :Y h i s 
t e s t i m o n y , e v e n t h o u g h he had d e p o s i t e d , t h e $7 ,500 check -one day 
e a r l i e r , 
Q (By Mr, Hornsby) And tell the members of 
the jury so that we're all clear on it, have 
we--what about payment? How are you being 
compensated? 
A' Well, we haven't worked out a 
compensation. My understanding is that there 
will be compensation. They have paid for my 
travel. Ah, my income has been greatly 
reduced and my insurance career has been, ah, 
severely damaged--
(Prudential Attorney) Objection, Your 
Honor, That's not responsive. 
Q (By Mr. Hornsby) All right. Do we offer 
to pay you an hourly rate? 
- A Ah r' 1 - -1 -don •' t have -any -hourly -figures 
of any kind, no, si r\, 
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(Discussion off the record between Mr, 
Hornsby and Mr, Morris.) 
(In open cour t : ) 
Q (By Mr. Hornsby) Mr. Mart in, have you ever 
known one of these policies, variable life 
policies, to abbreviate? 
A No, sir, 
Q To be paid up? 
A No, sir. 
(Kev v. Prudential Transcript at 535.) He has since indicated 
that he was confused by Hornsby's questions and regretted giving 
the above testimony. 
But I did not "know what my ultimate 
compensation would be because I was still in 
testimony. I was still working on the case, 
and I knew that figure could go up or down, 
so I was damned if I did and damned if I 
didn't. The question was not asked 
specifically. The man asking it knew the 
answer to the question, and when he knew--at 
the point when he asked the next question 
about the hourly--and it was very evident 
that I had no idea, and it should have been 
very apparent to them before trial or at that 
point that they didn't have a signed 
agreement from me--you know, they should have 
said something or reasked the question in a 
way that I could answer it truthfully. I 
answered it as best I could. It sort of 
ticked me off, I guess, to some degree. 
(Martin Deposition at 210-211.) 
Q My question remains what it was, if we 
could tomorrow go back down to Guntersville 
and retry that case, for you to have Mr. 
Hornsby ask the questions right so that you . 
could give a full answer--I know you believe 
you gave an honest answer—but so you could 
give-a - full -answer—so -that-the-number—$ 7, 500 — 
could get out there on the table, in your 
heart, Mr. Martin, in your heart, would you 
like us to go down there tomorrow and do that 
12 
i i i G u n t e r s v i 11 e, Alabama? r 
n o 
A J "jueci, ;' i «"o , . 
( I d ^ a t 249-250) . 
L a t e r t h*i same da^ <^ L xiib t : 
hi « '.-once . . h I' I.ennng. 
We pretty much went back through the 
testimony as I could recall, and certainly 
that was one of the things that I recalled 
being perplexed about and not being*able to 
answer it. I felt very, very solid* about 
everything else-I had answered, and I felt 
solid about answering this the way that I 
did. I was just not comfortable v/ith the way 
that they asked the question. 
concerr.. 
done sc 
amount c: . 
national 
approxirr. . 
who wished 
9 tr TJ, 
;
™ ^a i d he did not recal 1 discussing'his 
','•.' . Id at 220-221) ,. but that he might have 
- ,- .v verdict f:r *' plaintiff I t/-, 
figure *>-*- reported i 
received . 
. elephone cai-s : re policyholders* -.t.orneys 
"hire" Martin as a witness. (Transcript f f'l v^ nil'fr 
1
 ) . • 
On November 221 199G, Judge Wolin c:~ll *d Miller and read • 
portions cf Martin's Key testimony' : 
M a r t M I ^ • ' f f p r p r i | i i •» i i, L .: . z:*~:* -~ expeirt. 
Miller has stated that he war "ctt -.; discovery, 
(Miller Deposition at 80) , axia diai * 
-had «i "jsuiTi^ij, M ;i i tin Ud(! given-expert S- *~ O 1^. — . M w 
- a ; ^ t v - z 
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III. MILLER'S REPRESENTATION OF MASSARO 
John Massaro is a corporate general counsel for Prudential's 
Jacksonville, Florida office. While he has been on a paid leave 
of absence since September of 1996, no explanation for his leave 
can be found in the record before this Court. 
In 1995 and 1996, Massaro had a rolling case load of 
approximately 70 sales practices cases filed against Prudential. 
Included among his cases was Prudential's defense of the Rick 
Martin action, for which Massaro had "in-house responsibility" 
and retained local counsel. (Massaro Deposition at 94-95.) He 
also approved draft letters written by local counsel assigned to 
che Martin case, (Id. at 102). In February of 1995, Massaro 
composed a five-page, single-spaced letter to local counsel, 
which included his observations about the case, his reaction to 
Miller's settlement demand made on behalf of Martin, and his 
recommendations concerning Prudentialfs response to those 
demands- (IdL. at 96t 97, 99-100, 103-104.)8 
Massaro was also the in-house counsel responsible for the 
defense of Snowden v. Prudential from early 1996 through August 
1996. Since November, Miller has been plaintiff's counsel in 
Snowden~ (Reply Brief at 1.) 
Although Massaro had certainly heard of Miller, Miller 
8
 Because Prudential has never waived its privilege as to the 
content of Massaro1s work product, this Court ordered that 
Massaro ' s-deposition be - taken-under—seal- To—the-extent—this 
Report and Recommendation refers to Massarofs work product, the 
writer will attempt to summarize the import thereof without 
divulging its specific content. 
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i |,M pij 11 • 11 i i i i I  II11 > 11 11 I I11" e, b a 1 1 | )i>; | i r e I |i.j *..mi. v ,i J," ' J' (M 
when* Massaro telephoned him < \ his office late in the afternoon 
(Miller Depositior ; During this call, Massaro expressed 
i r, t, j!• i iii 111 j document withholding 
at Prudential, 2 ;. ir s . -: and, in fact, his voice broke . 
and he had difficulty maintaining his composure -during the call , 
(I las s ar o Depos i t i DII ) .* 
In particular, Massaro told Miller that he -^ distraught 
over documer* shreddinc Prudential - Michael ?:-•*— 
1 '] iident :i i 1 i .. _ i frich memoranda. In 
fact, Massaro nac nearc grinding noises as Earr ::ad operated - r -r 
shredding mi- ^  ^  :- ^ ^ ^ f i ? - right r^-^ 
!.•--. . ^ -, -Li owever, Massaro 
c:e nor express concern over thiis incident/ until more than a year 
later, i R c r r + ~r ,
 :^ ,*-- *«--^ . j^ 
In m .:. .. , . _ ^ ,, absence from Prudential, 
Massarc -1 ::~r nomas Tf-* Es I i^  " I ii highly regarded 
i j.c : i n ] ii . . 
r e p r e c . - * ^ a : ^ ; ^ v L Prudential regarding 
-employment -wcver, W ^ F either unabl^ rr • -'<': 1 1 • - to 
^-Cwiw*., . . .. . ^ c . L:.formed .-. • • - \ •* 7ew declined 
t ..: r epreser.tc* i, ,. i --. cited overwork due -~ - r-*--: 
< v - .ler 
.Deposition_at 4 2 8-.4 3 0.. )_.When_asked_direc.tly_why_lTew .was.riot-his: 
lawyer on this issue, Massaro cited the attorney cl I ent 
privilege, (Massaro Deposition at 522.) Massaro had also 
contacted Judy Hoyer and David Gross, two attorneys representing 
separate plaintiffs in suits against Prudential, but it is 
unclear' whether or not either or both declined to represent him. 
(Miller Deposition at-525-528.) Massaro claims that an attorney-
client relationship was established with* regard to both Hoyer and 
Gross. (Massaro Deposition at 535.) 
Massaro gives various reasons to explain how he selected 
Miller. He has stated that he learned of Miller by locating the 
J. Bruce Miller Law Group home page on the Internet by searching 
with the keyword "Prudential," (Id. at 245), and also that he 
sought out Miller because he was the lawyer most focused on the 
issue of document destruction'by Prudential, (Id. at 531-532), by 
virtue of Miller having joint" authority with Prudential to 
conduct: discovery on this issue.9 Either way, Massaro knew by 
December 16, 1996 that Miller was the plaintiff' s attorney 
adverse to Prudential in the Martin case. (Id. at 388-389.) In 
fact, in an August 22, 1995 memo, Massaro had described Miller 
and Martin in most derogatory terms. (Id., at 537-538.) 
Nonetheless, Massaro has minimized Millers history with 
Prudential as a factor in his decision to hire Miller. (Id, at 
539.) 
During one of their telephone conversations, Massaro asked 
Miller to represent him. Miller says that Massaro assured him 
9
 Miller was given this authority by Judge Wolin's order dated 
November 6, 1996. 
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that the Sonnenschein law firm, Prudential's Nev/ York attorneys, 
"controlled al 1 the decisions made regarding pending salens 
practices litigation, and that Massaro and Prudentialfs 
Jacksonville office had only ministerial responsibilitier 
•associated with the 1 itigation. (Mi lie .r Deposition at •;.0L<•• 410,) 
Miller also says that Massaro never, made him aware that.Massaro 
di sci issed settlement proposals, ' including. one made by Hi lie*? , 
with local "counsel,, (Id.) 
B e c a u s e Massaro had an a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
P r u d e n t : ' : "sel af ^ t:c • 
Prudenti-. i: . :., - . - *. - . : several . - his 
associate" :;-.er. c, , • ". - - . research ~: an expedited .basis to 
determd i ie], r-cl i ent p:ri i d 3 ege 
might appl} permit Massar* : isclose' Prudential"s 
confidences - :.: . ' others. ;id„ at: 4 ,J 3-439 ) Miller 
u - 1 v.Xs, ^ h t J i ii i | J L J i ' I 1 i.i 
pern.it c:;"„iosuref and U:I:I:LGC\ representation of Massaro c n a 
pro-bor.r * - - - : - -1~- ^  
^ . MJI I in id dii L inae r s i and ing 
t\.:-r h i e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n war l i m i t e d : i s s u e s of... document 
d e s t r u c t i o n by P n i d e n t i a l ; • however , Mil If i "' r engagement II e t t e r 
wl ie:r e i i i 1: i s ag i ees t : • i n ide .2 t a k e t h e t.t( J U . L I I I , , , . ] im i t 
i t s s c o p e i n any way. ( L e t t e r from, M i l l e i t:o Massaro c:" December 
1 8 / " ] 9 9 6 . ) ' ' ' 
-When. Massaro-was-deposed-during"-the'-Special Masteris 
investigation of the Helfrich memoranda and Barr document 
shredding incidents, he was questioned regarding 3 5 pages of 
confidential, media-sensitive notes that Massaro had written 
while working on cases for Prudential and that he had reviewed 
prior to composing his affidavit on the two incidents. (Massaro 
Deposition at 349-350.) These notes included Massaro1s 
settlement strategies in Martin v. Prudential and his mental 
impressions following a conversation with Clayton Boulware, a 
Prudential in-house general counsel, regarding defense strategies 
in Warden Coanetti v. Prudential, the first whistleblower case 
Prudential took to trial.10 (Transcript of February 11, 1997 
Hearing at 121-122.) Following the deposition, Massaro'and 
Miller each took away a copy of these notes and separately worked 
on the redactions to be made to protect Massaro!s attorney-client 
confidences given to Tew regarding employment issues. When 
Massaro gave these notes to Miller, there is no question that he 
divulged confidential attorney-client communications subject to 
Prudential's privilege. Miller's and Massaro1s separate versions 
later were incorporated together by Miller!s office manager. (Id. 
at 125-126.) 
On December 23, 1996, Massaro, accompanied by Miller, jnet 
two investigators from the Florida Attorney General's Office in a 
hotel room at the Jacksonville Marriott. The meeting lasted for 
six or seven hours, during which Massaro communicated his 
10
 The Sonnenschein defense attorneys who tried this case for 
-Prudential-were-Michael-Schlanger,-Esq.-and-Gregory-Karawan,-Esq. 
(Transcript of February 11, 1997 Hearing at 123.) Mr. Schlanger 
now serves as Prudential's lead counsel in support of the present 
cross-motion to disqualify Mr. Miller. 
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concerns regarding document shredding at Prudential by Michael 
Barr, and Prudential's delay in turning over the Helfrich 
memoranda. (Massaro Deposition at 507.) (Miller Deposition at 
499.) Massaro also indicated that he was concerned for his 
personal safety. (Id. at 500.) Although questioned at length on 
the subject of his apprehension, Massaro never articulated any 
basis for his fear. (Massaro Deposition at 499-509.) 
With the knowledge of the Florida Attorney General's office 
and Massaro, Miller tape-recorded the meeting. (Miller Deposition 
at 506.) Miller then advised Massaro that the best way to 
guarantee his personal safety was to "go public and blow' the 
whistle" on Prudential. (Id. at 504.) 
Immediately after the meeting, Massaro and Miller met with 
Scot Paltrow ("Paltrow") in a restaurant in the same Jacksonville 
Marriott where the interview took place. Paltrow is a reporter 
for the Los Angeles Times. (Id. at 507.) The three men then 
discussed what Massaro had told the regulators; this conversation 
lasted approximately 35 minutes. (Massaro Deposition at 456-459.) 
At the conclusion of the meeting, Miller and Massaro gave Paltrow 
the tapes of the meeting with the Florida investigators. (Miller 
Deposition at 507.) On December 26, 1996, Paltrow telephoned 
Massaro and read him a draft of the story, which Massaro 
apparently approved. (Massaro Deposition at 463-464.) The story 
was published the next day. 
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ANALYSIS 
Prudential rests its cross-motion to disqualify on .both the 
Martin and Massaro sub-plots to this litigation. Prudential 
interprets Miller's role in lfaffaire Martin such th^t he should 
be disqualified for negotiating and procuring fees for fact 
testimony. Miller's defense is that his version of what 
transpired should be believed. Next, Prudential invokes what it 
is calling the migratory attorney doctrine, i.e., once an 
attorney shifts his allegiances during a litigation or related 
litigation, the counsel adverse to his former client must be 
disqualified because client confidences are presumed to 'have been 
disclosed. Here Miller relies upon the crime-fraud and self-
defense exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. 
I. MARTIN'S TESTIMONY IN KEY V. PRUDENTIAL 
It is unethical to pay any fact witness a fee that clearly 
exceeds travel expenses plus the reasonable value of time lost. 
Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-
Marine Ass'n, 865 F. Supp. 1516, 1521, 1526 and n. 11 (S.D. Fla. 
1994) (holding that a lawyer is prohibited "from paying or 
offering to pay money or other rewards to witnesses in return for 
their testimony, be it truthful or not, because it violates the 
integrity of the justice system and undermines the proper 
administration of justice"). Payments for fact witness testimony 
that exceed travel expenses and the value of time lost are also 
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illegal under the federal bribery statue, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)11 
and violate Rule 3.4 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional 
Conduct.12 It is undisputed nonetheless that Rick Martin 
testified as a fact witness in Key v. Prudential, and that he was 
paid handsomely for his testimony. Hornsby admits that the 
payments to Martin and Miller of.approximately $25,000 were "a.' 
good bit," (Hornsby Deposition at 156),' and more than he 
personally felt they should have been, (Id,) -(October 19," 1996 
Affidavit of Samuel H. Franklin at 2). 
The facts indicate that Miller brokered Martin's testimony 
in such a way that he could plausibly deny being aware of its 
content, while Martin could plausibly deny knowing its price. 
For this reason, Miller/Morris and Martin/Hornsby conducted 
divided meetings at the Nashville Marriott. But later, during 
conversations among Miller, Martin, Fleming,. Hornsby, and Morris 
which took place after the bargain was struck, details of the 
planned testimony were shared with Miller, and 'details of the 
financial arrangements were shared with Martin, who in any case 
received partial payment the day before he "testified. 
Miller and Fleming have given an innocent explanation for 
their absence during Martin's testimony, that Key would benefit 
11
 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) • makes it a crime to directly or 
indirectly give, offer, or promise "anything of value to any 
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation 
given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a' trial, 
_ h e a r i n g ,_or__other_proceeding,__bef ore _any__court ._*.._._!!__ 
12
 Under R.P.C. 3 . 4 ( b ) , a lawyer s h a l l no t " o f f e r an inducement 
t o a wi tness .that i s p r o h i b i t e d by law." 
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from having only Alabama lawyers seated in the courtroom. The 
Court finds it tnore likely that they, first, did not .want to be 
in the room when fact testimony was given, and, second, hoped 
their absence would permit Miller to say that he did not "know 
what Martinfs testimony was. 
It appears certain that Miller and Martin planned to reap 
financial rewards from a testimonial dog and pony show to be 
billed as the trial highlight of lawsuits.against Prudential . 
across the country. This egregious conduct cannot be 
countenanced. Accordingly, Miller must be held accountable for 
misconduct regarding the Martin testimony in the Key case, by 
virtue of his obtaining a fee for procuring the testimony of a 
fact witness, and his assisting a fact witness in obtaining a 
payment for his testimony. Disqualification thus is warranted on 
this issue.13 
II. MILLER'S REPRESENTATION OF MASSARO 
Cases giving rise to motions to disqualify often involve 
factual situations where an attorney or expert switches sides. 
See NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman. 71 F.R.D. 338, 340 
(S.D.N.Y.) (disqualifying attorney who, following termination of 
13
 There is no doubt that Martin gave false testimony during 
Key v. Prudential when asked about his compensation.' Further, the. 
Court questions the conduct and intentions of Hornsby and Morris, 
who solicited Miller, participated in Martin's wrongdoing, and 
failed to call to the trial judge1 s attention the fact that Martin 
had testified falsely. Accordingly, the Court must recommend that 
-the-matter-of — Martin1 s-..testimony— and-the.attorneys.1 conduct—be 
referred for such investigation and disciplinary action as may be 
deemed appropriate by the Alabama and Kentucky attorney ethics 
committees. 
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his services as in-house counsel for plaintiff corporation, 
undertook representation of a defendant in the very same 
litigation on which he had formerly worked when employed by the 
plaintiff), aff d, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976). See also'.Cardona 
v. General Motors Corp.. 942 P. Supp. 968, 978 (D.N.J. 1996) 
(affirming disqualification of law firm representing plaintiffs 
in lemon law actions after the firm hired an attorney who had 
represented the automobile manufacturer in his prior employment) ; 
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co,, 109.N.J. 201, 216 (1988) " 
(disqualifying plaintifffs attorney whose former law partner 
represented the defendants in the same case) . • 
The attorney need not have actually divulged client 
confidences to the other side in order to be disqualified. 
Actual-disclosure is not the test; rather the test is whether 
there is a risk that confidential information has been used « 
unfairly. Cordv v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 584 
(D.K.J. 1994) (disqualifying both the defense counsel and the 
expert retained by defense counsel when the plaintiff's attorney 
had previously consulted the expert on the same case). Steel v. 
General Motors Corporation, 912 F. Supp. 724, 738 (D.N.J. 1995) 
(disqualifying law firm representing lemon law plaintiffs after 
the firm hired an attorney who had previously represented the 
automobile manufacturer in other lemon law cases) , order afffd by 
942 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1996). See also Millburn Marketing 
Associates -v-.- Parker- Laboratories - Inc r—19941WL-228531-at~*4~ 
(D.N.J.) ("The law relies upon possible, rather than actual, 
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possession of relevant confidences...."). Furthermore, the 
attorney1s lack of memory of receiving confidential information 
due to the passage of time cannot rebut the presumption that in 
the past confidences were revealed. Id. at *5. 
Any doubts that arise in connection with a motion for 
disqualification must be resolved in favor of disqualification. 
NCK Organization, 71 F.R.D. at 340. Millburn Marketinq, at *5. 
Rather than an attorney who has switched sides, the cross-
motion presently being decided involves an attorney who has 
become the client of counsel for the other side. The Court has 
never encountered a factual situation similar to this one. At 
least one published case, however, squarely addresses this rare 
circumstance. In Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2nd Cir. 
1975), a civil rights plaintiff ("Hull") filed suit against her 
employer, alleging sex-based discrimination in violation of Title 
VII. After the corporation filed its answer, a female attorney 
in its in-house legal department ("Delulio"), who had worked on 
the defense of the case, intervened as a plaintiff in the action. 
Hull and Delulio were represented by the same law firm. The 
corporation then sought and was granted disqualification of the 
firm, even though the firm had made efforts to avoid the receipt 
of any confidence. 
The Hull court was presented'with a "divergence from the 
more usual situation of the lawyer switching sides to represent 
_an interest_adverse__to_ his_initial__representation.w Id. _at_572_._ 
In Hull, "the in-house counsel for Celanese switched sides to 
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become a plaintiff (rather than a lawyer) on the other side," Id. 
The court observed that "the matter at issue is not merely 
'substantially related1 to the previous representation, rather, 
it is exactly the same litigation, " and further observed that the 
admonition to avoid even the appearance of impropriety should 
apply just as it would in the more typical situation of a lawyer 
changing sides. Id. The court then concluded that 
"disqualification is fa necessary and desirable remedy ... to 
enforce the lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity and to guard 
against the danger of inadvertent use of confidential 
information... . ' " Id. (citations omitted). As the matter 
presently being decided also involves an in-house counsel 
switching sides to become a client rather than a lawyer on the 
other side, this Court finds the logic of Hull to be compelling. 
Attorneys in this proceeding are governed by the New Jersey 
Rules of Professional Conduct ("R.P.C."), even as to conduct 
occurring in other states. See In re Prudential Insurance Company 
of America Sales Practices Litigation, 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 
1995. The following rules are implicated in the present motion: 
R.P.C. 1.6(b) , 1.6(c) . 1.6 (d) 
A lawyer shall reveal [information relating 
to representation of a client) to the proper 
authorities, as soon as, and to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to 
prevent the client [from committing a crime 
or fraud] or [from perpetrating a fraud upon 
the tribunal]. 
A lawyer may reveal such information to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
-necessary [to-rectify the-consequences-of the 
crime or fraud] or to establish a claim or 
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client.... 
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Reasonable belief for purposes of R.P.C. 
1.6 is the belief or conclusion of a 
reasonable lawyer that is based upon 
information that has some foundation in fact 
and constitutes prima facie evidence of the 
matters referred to in subsection (b) or (c) . 
R.P.C. 8,4 (a) 
It is professional misconduct .for a lawyer to 
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly.assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the 
act of another. 
R.P.C, 1.7(c)(2) 
[I]n certain "cases or situations creating an 
appearance of impropriety rather than an 
actual conflict, multiple representation is .' 
not permissible, that is, in those situations 
in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen 
acquainted with the facts would conclude that ' 
the multiple representation poses substantial 
risk of disservice to either the public 
interest or the interest of one of the 
clients-
The record shows that Prudential's confidences were, in 
fact, divulged to Miller. At a minimum, Massaro shared the 35 
pages of confidential notes which included Massaro!s mental 
impressions regarding defense strategies in both Martin v. 
Prudential and Warden Coanetti v. Prudential. In order to 
recommend redactions that would protect Massaro's attorney-client 
confidences given to Tew regarding Massaro's employment, Miller 
had to read every word of these notes. Thus, Massaro has 
violated R.P.C. 1.6(b), 1.6(c), and 1.6(d), and Miller was the 
beneficiary of his disclosures. 
There is no doubt that Massaro has also divulged 
Prudential' s -confidences -regarding-document-destruction -and — 
withholding. By way of justification of Massaro's disclosure of 
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these confidences, Miller cites the crime-fraud exception and the 
self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilegev This 
reliance is misplaced, however, because, as to both exceptions, 
the lawyer may reveal confidences only to the extent he 
reasonably believes necessary, based upon information .that has 
some foundation in fact. The law thus presents three 
difficulties that Miller is unable to surmount* First, the 
crime-fraud exception does not apply, because*the Special 
Master's Report concludes that-neither the Barr incident nor the 
Helfrich memoranda could be construed as an ongoing crime or 
fraud at the" time of Massaro's disclosure. Second, the self-
defense exception does not apply, because Massaro has never been 
called upon to defend his conduct as an attorney for 
Prudential.14 Finally, even if the crime-fraud or self-defense 
exception did apply, no reasonable attorney would conclude that 
the proper disclosure'would be to the Los Angeles Times. In this 
instance, rather, the proper course of action would have been for 
Massaro to go to the tribunal to obtain a judicial determination 
and court order that an exception to the privilege applies. 
United States v. 2olin, .491 U.S. 554 (1989) . 
Thus, at a minimum, Miller has violated R.P.C. 8.4(a) and 
R.P.C. 1.7(c) (2), by assisting Massaro's breach of his duty of 
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege to Prudential. 
u
 The lawyer's self-defense exception has possible application 
in a. suit.. f or^malpract ice, _.a_bar _disciplinary_charge,. a ^criminal. 
case, or when the lawyer brings an action against the client for 
fees. Edna Epstein, The Attorney Client Privilege and the Work 
Product Doctrine at 278 (American Bar Association, 1997). 
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The Court has questioned whether Massaro was in need of 
legal representation, even assuming that he had a legitimate 
concern over Prudential's conduct in connection with Barr's 
destruction of documents and the withholding of the Helfrich 
memoranda. Nevertheless, if Massaro felt the need to seek legal 
advice as to his obligations on those subjects, it is clear that 
J. Bruce Miller was not among the attorneys practicing in this 
country eligible to provide that advice. The'Court concludes 
that Massaro chose Miller because he had, for reasons yet 
unexplained, become embittered with Prudential and decided to 
switch sides. Miller argues that he was the logical person for 
Massaro to call because no other attorney had authority to 
conduct discovery on document destruction issues. The undeniable 
flaw with this argument is that Prudential counsel also had this 
authority, and Massaro could have sought their advice without 
violating client confidences.15 
The facts in this case are extraordinary; the decision to be 
made is not close. Once Miller established an attorney-client 
relationship with Massaro, he was presumed to have obtained, and 
in fact did obtain, access to Prudential's confidences, including 
its defense strategies in cases filed by plaintiffs represented 
by Miller. Accordingly Miller's disqualification is warranted on 
15
 If Massaro testified truthfully that an attorney-client 
relationship was established with regard to both Hoyer and Gross, 
— then these attorneys-may also be subject-to disqualification.—The 
Court recommends that Prudential be given leave to depose Hoyer and 
Gross. The Court will entertain such further motions as may be 
appropriate following those depositions-
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this basis as well.16 
REMEDIES 
Prudential seeks the following relief: (1) disqualification 
of J, Bruce Miller and his firm from representing Rick Martin and* 
other former Prudential sales agents in the pending MDL; (2) 
disqualification of J- Bruce Miller as lead/liaison counsel in 
the MDL; (3) an injunction against Miller continuing the 
representation of plaintiffs whose cases against Prudential are 
pending outside the MDL; (4) an injunction against Miller 
pursuing or taking new cases against Prudential/ whether agent or 
policyholder cases, in any state or federal forum; (5) ail 
injunction against Miller taking compensation or anything of 
value in consideration of his involvement in any agent or 
policyholder case against Prudential; (6) an injunction against 
Miller divulging any of Prudential's confidences learned during 
his representation of Massaro; and (7) an order that Miller 
disgorge compensation he has received in connection with 
representation of any party adverse to Prudential, 
CONCLUSION 
The irony of Prudential crying foul play, fast upon 
allegations against the company by thousands of policyholders and 
employees, not to mention a $1,000,000 sanction for confirmed and 
willful document destruction, is not lost upon this Court. 
16
 Neither side has briefed the question of prejudice to 
Miller' s —plaintiffs, —which — could—arguably—be created by-
disqualifying their lawyer. Nonetheless, the Court finds that no 
prejudice exists because the sales agent cases are stayed and the 
plaintiffs will have adequate time to obtain new counsel. 
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Nevertheless, it must recommend that the following relief be 
granted Prudential on its cross-motion: (1) the disqualification 
of J. Bruce Miller and his firm from representing Rick Martin and 
other former Prudential sales agents in the pending MDL, and (2) 
the disqualification of J. Bruce Miller as lead/liaison counsel 
for sales agents in the MDL. Because the remainder of the relief 
sought was first raised at oral argument- and was not briefed, 
Miller should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the 
availability of these remedies to Prudential. Therefore, the 
undersigned directs that additional briefing as to the other 
relief sought, in particular as to the Court's in personam 
jurisdiction over Miller with regard to non-MDL cases, be 
submitted by Prudential not later than March 7, 1997, Miller's 
• response brief shall be filed not later than March 21, 1997. 
The parties are reminded that pursuant to General Rule 
40D(5), they have ten (10) days from receipt of this Report & 
Recommendation to file and serve objections to it, 
^ ^ 
JOEL A. PlrfAtfO 
United States MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Hon. Alfred M. Wolin 
- All-parties 
File 
30 
r i*\ 
^tAI m:KincK,UA:\£iu - i a - a / . z-4«±rm ,iui\uv, UH.\^IU imo^- u i u ^ u u u u i , , , / < : l 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
IN RE THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA 
SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION 
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO 
ACTIONS 
OPINION 
Civil Action No. 95-612 
WallaJCtistrict Judge 
Before this Court is the Report and Recommendation of the Hon. Joel A. Pisano, 
U.S.MJ. filed on February 20, 1997. The Magistrate Judge has recommended that this Court 
grant the cross-motion brought by The Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential") to 
disqualify J. Bruce Miller, Esq., lead/liaison counsel for plaintiff sales agents who have filed 
wrongful termination or retaliation claims against Prudential. Miller has filed objections to the 
Report and Recommendation to which Prudential has responded. Miller has voluntarily 
dismissed his motions to stay this Court's review of the Report and Recommendation and strike 
Prudential's response to his objections. For the reasons that follow, the Court will adopt the 
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Prudential moves to sanction and disqualify Miller on the grounds that: (1) he negotiated 
and procured fees for fact testimony presented by his client, former Prudential district manager 
1 
Rick Martin, during Key v. Prudential, an individual policyholder lawsuit tried before an 
Alabama jury in 1995, and (2) that he has gained improper knowledge of Prudential's client 
confidences through his representation of John Massaro, a corporate general counsel at 
Prudential and helped Massaro breach his attorney-client relationship with Prudential. Rather 
than set forth fully the complex progression of events out of which Prudential's cross-motion 
arises, the Court will paint, with broad strokes, the relevant factual background. 
This matter arises out of a number of lawsuits brought by life insurance policyholders 
alleging that Prudential engaged in a scheme of improper and illegal sales practices. In addition 
to these policyholder lawsuits, a number of cases against Prudential have been filed by sales 
agents alleging that adverse personnel actions were taken against them because they failed to 
engage in illegal sales practices. In August of 1995, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District 
Litigation transferred all actions relating to Prudential's sales practices, including individual and 
class action policyholder, sales agent and whistleblowcr cases (collectively MMDLM) to the 
District of New Jersey and assigned to District Judge Alfred Wolin. 
A. Martin's Testimony in Kev v. Prudential 
Currently, there are approximately twenty sales agent cases included in the MDL and 
Miller is counsel for four of these plaintiffs. One of these plaintiffs is Rick Martin who, until his 
employment was terminated in 1992, was a district manager of Prudential in Pacudah, Kentucky. 
Miller began representing Martin in February 1 993 and filed suit against Prudential on his behalf 
in January of 1995. 
During the Spring of 1995, Clay Hornsby and his law firm Morris, Haynes, Ingram & 
2 
# • 
Homsby of Alexander City, Alabama learned of Martin's lawsuit and decided that they wanted to 
present Martin's testimony in Key v. Prudential, an individual policyholder action in which they 
served as plaintiffs counsel. On July 29, 1995, after exchanging a series of letters and phone 
calls, Miller and Martin met with Hornsby and his partner Larry Morris at an airport conference 
room in Nashville, Tennessee. Soon after the meeting was convened the attorneys and Martin 
separated into two groups: Miller and Morris hammered out the financial arrangements and 
Martin and Homsby discussed the content of Martin's proposed testimony. It was eventually 
agreed that Martin would be paid an initial fee of 57,500 for his testimony and Miller's firm 
would receive a 510,000 "signing bonus" for procuring Martin's testimony. On August 11, 1995, 
Miller deposited both payments into a trustee account. On August 17, 1995, Miller wrote a 
5 7,500 check from the trustee account to Martin who deposited the check into his account on 
August 22, 1995. Miller used part of the S 10,000 payment to his firm to defray expenses 
associated with litigating Martin's case. Later, on December 29, 1995, Hornsby's firm paid the 
Miller Law Group an additional $ 8, 587 for legal services rendered. 
Neither Miller nor his associate Dennis Fleming was present in the courtroom when 
Martin testified in the Key case on August 23, 1995. Miller was in St. Louis conducting 
depositions for an unrelated legal matter and Fleming, who accompanied Martin to Alabama, left 
the courtroom shortly before Martin took the stand. According to Miller, Fleming left the 
courtroom at the request of Homsby and Morris who wanted only local attorneys present during 
Martin's testimony to draw a greater contrast between Prudential's and plaintiffs legal teams. 
Homsby and Morris made no attempt to qualify Martin as an expert nor did he give expert 
testimony. Instead, he presented about an hour's worth of fact testimony related to his experience 
3 
as a Prudential agent. While on the stand, Martin denied being aware of any financial 
arrangements made in connection with his testimony even though he had deposited the $7,500 
check into his account the day before. The Key jury returned a $ 25,000,000 verdict for the 
plaintiff. Following the verdict, Miller received hundreds of phone calls from policyholder 
attorneys seeking to hire Martin as a witness. On November 22, 1995, District Judge Alfred 
Wolin called Miller and read him portions of Martin's Key testimony. Miller told the judge that 
he was "stunned" to discover that Martin had not given expert testimony. 
B. Miller's Improper Representation of John Massaro 
In December of 1996, Miller undertook the representation of John Massaro, a corporate 
general counsel for Prudential's Jacksonville Florida office. In 1995 and 1996, Massaro had a 
rolling caseload of approximately seventy sales practices cases filed against Prudential, including 
in-house counsel responsibility for the Martin lawsuit. In that capacity, he obtained local 
counsel for the Martin case, approved draft letters written by local counsel, and offered local 
counsel his observations regarding the case, including Miller's settlement demands. In 
November 1996, Miller became plaintiffs counsel in Snowden v. Prudential, a case for which, 
until August 1996, Massaro had responsibility as in-house counsel. It is noted that Massaro had 
been on a leave of absence from Prudential since September of 1996. The record, however, 
provides no explanation for his leave. 
On December 16, 1996, Massaro telephoned Miller distraught over the destruction and 
withholding of documents by Prudential. He was so upset that his voice broke and he found it 
difficult to maintain his composure during the call. He told Miller that more than a year earlier, 
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in September o f ! 9 9 5 , Michael Barr, a partner at Sonneschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Prudential's 
lead outside counsel in the sales practices litigation, had shredded a number of documents at the 
Jacksonville office. He also expressed his discomfort regarding Prudential's delay in turning 
over memoranda written by James C. Helfrich, a former in-house counsel at Prudential's 
Jacksonville Florida office, warning Prudential's senior management that a significant number of 
complaints had been received regarding improper sales practices and recommending that 
Prudential implement a plan to address and correct the problem Prudential did not take the 
actions recommended in the memoranda. In January of 1996, in response to a subpoena, 
Prudential produced the Helfrich memoranda to the Florida Attorney General. However, 
Prudential waited until July 2, 1996 before producing the memoranda to the Multi-State Task 
Force convened to investigate allegations of improper sales practices by Prudential and other 
insurance companies, even though Task Force members had earlier requested the types of 
documents that would have included the memoranda. Because Prudential delayed producing the 
memoranda, the Task Force's report did not include a definitive finding that senior management 
at Prudential was aware of the improper sales practices. 
Massaro had earlier hired Thomas Tew, Esq. to represent him in connection with his 
request for a leave of absence from Prudential Tew however, was either unwilling or unable to 
advise and represent him regarding his document destruction concerns Massaro, claiming 
attorney-client privilege, has declined to answer directly exactly why Tew was not his attorney 
on this issue Massaro, however, has offered various reasons why he asked Miller to represent 
him: he claims that he obtained his name from the Internet and that he sought him out because 
he was the attorney most focused on document destruction at Prudential. One thing, however, is 
5 
clear. By December 16, 1996, Massaro knew that Miller was the plaintiffs attorney in the 
Martin case. Nonetheless, Massaro has minimized Miller's history with Prudential as a factor in 
his decision to secure him as counsel. In turn, Miller denies knowing anything about Massaro 
before receiving his call for representation. He claims that Massaro told him that the 
Sonnenschein law firm, Prudential's New York attorneys, controlled all the decisions regarding 
the sales practices litigation and that he and the Jacksonville, Florida office had only ministerial 
responsibilities regarding the litigation. Miller asserts that Massaro never told him that he had 
discussed settlement proposals, including one made by Miller, with local counsel. 
Because Massaro enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with Prudential, and Miller was 
plaintiffs' counsel adverse to Prudential, Miller and his associates conducted legal research to 
determine if an exception to the attorney-client privilege would permit Massaro to disclose 
Prudential's confidences to him or others. Miller unilaterally determined that the crime-fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege pciroitted such disclosure. Thereafter, he undertook 
representation of Massaro on a pro bono basis. While Miller insists that his representation of 
Massaro was limited to the document shredding and withholding, Miller's engagement letter does 
not, in any way, limit the scope of his representation. 
On December 23, 1996, Miller accompanied Massaro to a meeting with investigators 
from the Florida Attorney General's Office. Miller taped the meeting with the consent of all 
participants. At the meeting, Massaro expressed his concerns regarding document shredding at 
Prudential by Michael Barr Prudential's delay in turning over the Helfrich memoranda and for 
his own physical safety although, despite lengthy questioning, he never articulated justification 
for his fears. Immediately after the meeting, Massaro and Miller met with Scot Paltrow, a 
6 
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reporter for the Los Angeles Times. During this meeting, the three men discussed what Massaro 
had told regulators and Massaro gave him tapes of the meeting. On December 26, 1996, Paltrow 
telephoned Massaro and read him a draft of the story, which Massaro apparently approved. The 
story was published the following day. 
In January of 1997, Judge Wolin appointed a Special Master to investigate Prudential's 
alleged withholding of the Helfrich memoranda and Ban's document destruction. When Massaro 
was deposed during the Special Master's investigation early this year he was questioned about 
thirty-five pages of confidential notes he had written while working on cases for Prudential and 
which he reviewed before composing his affidavit regarding the two incidents. These notes 
contained Massaro's settlement strategies in Martin v. Prudential and his mental impressions 
following a conversation with Clayton Boulware, a Prudential in-house general counsel, 
regarding defense strategics in Warden Cognetti v. Prudential, the first whistlcblower case that 
Prudential took to trial. After the deposition, Massaro and Miller both took copies of these notes 
and separately worked on the redactions to be made to protect Massaro's attorney-client 
confidences given to Tew regarding his employment issues. 
Prudential subsequently brought this action to disqualify Miller based on the Martin and 
Massaro "subplots" to this litigation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that Miller should be disqualified as lead/liaison counsel because he helped Martin 
obtain a fee for his fact testimony and because Miller's law firm received payment for procuring 
Martin's fact testimony. Specifically, he determined that Miller conveniently brokered Martin's 
testimony in such a way that he could plausibly deny being aware of its content and Martin could 
plausibly deny knowing its price. He also determined that together Miller and Martin planned to 
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reap financial rewards "from a testimonial dog and pony show to be billed as the trial highlight of 
lawsuits against Prudential across the country." (R&R at 22). The Magistrate Judge further 
found that Miller had benefited from Massaro's ethical violation in switching sides of this legal 
dispute and that neither the crime-fraud and self defense exceptions to the attorney client 
privilege immunized his actions. Specifically, he found that by giving Miller a copy of the 
thirty-five pages of confidential, "media sensitive" notes he had written while working on cases 
for Prudential, Massaro unquestionably divulged confidential attorney-client communications. 
He determined that in order to recommend redactions that would protect Massaro's attorney-
client confidences in the notes Massaro gave to Tew, Miller had to have read every single one of 
these notes. Accordingly, he found that Miller violated Rules 8.41 and 1.7 (c)(2)2 of the New 
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct by assisting Massaro's breach his attorney-client privilege 
with Prudential. 
Miller has filed extensive objections to the Magistrate Judge's report. He argues that the 
Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that he was aware that Martin provided paid fact testimony 
during the Key trial, that he obtained access to Prudential's confidences while representing 
Massaro and that he helped Massaro breach his attorney client relationship with Prudential. In 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the act of 
another R.P.C 8.4(a) 
2[I]n certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an 
actual conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which the 
ordinarily knowledgeable citizen acquainted writh the facts would conclude that the multiple 
representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of 
one of those clients. R.P.C. 1.7(c)(2) 
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addition, he asserts that the crime fraud and self-defense exceptions to the attorney-client 
privilege were applicable and thus, even if any disclosures of Prudential's confidences did occur 
such disclosure would have been proper. 
EISCUSSIOK 
A. Standard of Review 
The court must review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's report and 
recommendation to which objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); National Labor 
Relations Bd v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 1992). A de novo review means that a 
magistrate's findings are not protected by the clearly erroneous standard but does not require a 
second evidentiary hearing. Sec U.S. v. Raddatz, All U.S. 653, 667 (1980). The district judge 
may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit 
the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 
B Milter's Objections 
Because Miller practically objects to the Report and Recommendation in its entirety, 
this Court considers de novo whether Miller should be disqualified for helping Martin obtain a 
fee for his factual testimony and obtaining a "signing bonus" for his firm and whether he should 
be disqualified because through his representation of Massaro he obtained access to Prudential's 
confidences and assisted Massaro violate his attorney-client relationship with Prudential. 
As the Magistrate Judge observed, and Miller does not dispute, paying any fact witness a 
fee that clearly exceeds travel expenses plus reasonable time loss is an ethical violation, a 
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violation of the federal bribery statutes and the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct. 
See, e.g., Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n, 865 
F.Supp. 1516, 1521. 1526 and n . l l (S.D. Fla. 1994). Payment for fact witness testimony that 
exceeds travel expenses and the value of time lost are also illegal under the federal bribery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) and violates Rule 3.4 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional 
conduct, (a lawyer shall not "offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.") 
Miller argues that Magistrate Judge Pisano ignored key factual issues regarding Martin's 
Key testimony. For example, he claims, among other things, that the Magistrate Judge 
overlooked his rejection of Homsby's request for Martin's testimony in a June 16, 1995 letter, 
failed to consider that all correspondence from July 3, 1995 onward between Homsby and Miller 
refers to Martin's "expert testimony" or to Martin as an "expert witness," and that meeting that 
the Nashville meeting involved more than making suitable financial arrangements. He also 
claims that the Magistrate Judge improperly relied on representations by Prudential's counsel 
Michael Schlanger regarding the number of discussions that took place regarding the number of 
discussions that occurred between Martin and Miller, Martin and Fleming and between Fleming 
and Homsby. He also charges that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that Martin did not 
have to refund any of the $7,500 if he spent less time working on the case. Finally, he objects to 
the Magistrate's characterization of his absence and that of his associate Fleming as neatly 
providing him with a convenient excuse to claim ignorance regarding Martin's presentation of 
fact testimony during the trial. He attributes Fleming's absence as acquiescence to a request by 
Homsby that he not be present in the courtroom. 
This Court reads Miller's numerous objections as nothing more than a desperate attempt 
10 
SfcjNT BY:KlKtK,UA:\ZlG - 1 3 - 3 / ; 2:4ara ;KIMLK,UAAZ.IL itLKLK-* oio^ooao^.frw/^j 
to salvage his role as lead/liaison counsel. None of the "facts" that he cites changes the 
undisputed fact that he helped Martin obtain $7,500 for an hour's worth of fact testimony and that 
his law firm received a $ 10,000 signing bonus for this arrangement. Nor does he make it better 
by pointing out that he used the money to defray the litigation costs of Martin. After reviewing 
the record in this case de novo, this Court believes that Magistrate Judge's findings are sound. 
The events appear to have been cleverly orchestrated for the purpose of later denial of 
knowledge of the financial arrangements. 
This Court is also satisfied that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Miller 
violated ethical rules by representing Massaro and that neither the crime-fraud nor self-defense 
exceptions to the attorney client privilege is applicable. As noted in his Report and 
Recommendation, "cases giving rise to motions to disqualify often involve factual situations 
where an attorney or expert switches sides.T' (Report and Recommendation at 22). Incredibly, 
Miller responds to this observation with the incredulous claim that Massaro did not switch sides 
because he firmly believes that he is still a "loyal member of Prudential's employment" who was 
"compelled to differ with his employer when his employer refused to take the action that 
Massaro deemed appropriate from a legal and ethical standpoint. . . ." (Miller's Objections at 
24.). Unquestionably, Massaro's disclosures regarding Prudential's document shredding and 
withholding were adverse to Prudential. Thus, Massaro switched sides. Miller then argues that 
Prudential has offered no proof that there is any risk that confidential information has been used 
unfairly He further notes that according to Massaro, the thirty-five pages of confidential notes 
did not contain any references to his mental impressions in the Martin and Warden Cognetti 
cases and that the references to Warden Cognetti only included comments regarding 
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''Compliance 101," a tape Miller asserts was no secret and which was broadcast on Primetime 
Live last December, He further argues that even assuming that Massaro's "mental impressions" 
were in the confidential notes, Massaro believes that the divulgence of such confidences was 
justified because "Miller was not aware of these notes and Affiant did not show these notes or 
discuss their contents with Miller until the day of Affiant's testimony before the Special Master . 
. . ." (Miller's Objections, at 26 (quoting Massaro Deposition, Appendix J, at 8)). Equally 
incredible is his suggestion that he deserves praise for his decision to represent Massaro because 
"the effect of Miller's limited representation of Massaro has been the final substantiation before 
the Special Master and the recognition by the Special Master and District Judge Wolin that 
Prudential knowingly withheld the Helfrich memoranda from the Task Force." (Id. at 22). 
In advancing these arguments, Miller misplaces the burden upon Prudential. Prudential 
does not have to prove that the notes contained confidential information. As the Magistrate 
Judge correctly explained, the "actual disclosure [of information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege] is not the test; rather the test is whether there is a risk that confidential information has 
been used unfairly." (Report and Recommendation at 23 (citing Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 
256 F.R.D. 575, 584 (D.N.J. 1994); Steel v. General Motors Corp., 912 F.Supp 724, 738 (D.N.J. 
1995), order affdby, 942 F.Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1996)). If there arc any doubts as to whether 
confidences were shared, counsel must be disqualified. Here, the Court has no such doubts. The 
record reveals that Massaro shared Prudential's confidences with Miller. At the least, Massaro 
shared the thirty-five pages of confidential notes, including his mental impressions of defense 
strategies in Martin and Warden Cognctti. In order to recommend redactions to Massaro, Miller 
had to have read all of the notes. No other explanation for what occurred is plausible. 
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Accordingly, the Court finds that Miller's representation reflects a serious ethical breach 
warranting disqualification. 
Furthermore, the Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the crime-fraud and 
self-defense exceptions to the attorney-client privilege do not immunize Miller's actions. The 
crime-fraud exception does not apply because Massaro did not disclose an ongoing fraud or 
crime. Over a year had elapsed before he disclosed Barr's document shredding and he knew that 
the Helfrich memoranda had been produced several months prior to his disclosure. In addition, 
the Special Master's Report concluded that neither incident could be construed as an ongoing 
fraud or crime at the time of Massaro's disclosure. Massaro's statements that he sincerely 
believed that his disclosure was necessary to prevent a crime or fraud appear to be nothing more 
than self-serving attempts to sanitize his decision to seek Miller's legal representation. Finally, 
the self-defense exception does not apply because Massaro had not been called upon to defend 
his conduct as an attorney for Prudential. As the Magistrate Judge explained, this is not a "close 
case." Even if Massaro had a legitimate concern about Prudential's conduct, Miller clearly was 
not the attorney appropriate to offer him legal advice and representation. Accordingly, this Court 
adopts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and will grant Prudential's 
cross-motion to disqualify Miller. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court adopts the Recommendation and Report of the 
Magistrate Judge and grants Prudential's cross-motion to disqualify Miller. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
IN RE THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA 
SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION 
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO 
ACTIONS 
OPINION 
Civil Action No. 95-612 
The Court, having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the Hon. Joel A. Pisano, 
U.S.M.J. filed on February 20, 1997, and all the submissions of the parties, and for good cause 
shown adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and grants the cross-motion 
brought by The Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential") to disqualify J. Bruce Miller, Esq. 
as lead/ liaison counsel for plaintiff sales agents. 
/ 
William H. Wills, U.S.D J . ^ , / 
Dated 
Tab 4 
ADDENDUM 4 
Disclosed Document: 
Exhibit 5 to Complaint (R.51-
53) and Exhibit 1 to Affidavit 
of Brett G. Pearce (R. 347). 
Nature/Purpose of the Communication: 
This internal memorandum summarized a confidential meeting between 
Mr. Spratley and State Farm's claims managers to exchange views on 
litigation handled by Mr. Spratley, Mr. Pearce, and other CLC lawyers. 
This confidential memorandum detailed candid discussions with claims 
personnel regarding specific aspects of legal services provided by Mr. 
Spratley's CLC office. They discussed preferences and strategies for 
discovery, settlement, and trial, as well as the best means of facilitating 
future attorney-client communications and reporting. State Farm 
submitted an affidavit showing that every sentence in this memorandum 
is a disclosure "incidental to the professional relationship" between 
plaintiffs and State Farm within the meaning of Rule 504. (See R. 643-
44). 
Exhibits 1 and 2 to Affidavit of 
Richard K. Spratley (R. 347). 
These confidential letters from a State Farm Claim Superintendent to 
Mr. Spratley summarized discussions between the two relating to 
discovery, trial, and the use of experts in litigation. Spratley and Pearce 
do not dispute that both the letters and the discussions were confidential. 
These letters were unquestionably written to facilitate the legal services 
performed by Mr. Spratley's CLC office. (See R. 635-36). 
Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Brett 
G. Pearce (R. 347). 
This letter from Mr. Pearce to a State Farm claims representative 
summarized their confidential conversation regarding settlement 
authority in a specific case. Plaintiffs do not dispute that both the letter 
and the conversation were confidential. The letter's sole purpose was to 
facilitate Mr. Pearce's legal services in his settlement of the case on 
behalf of State Farm. (See R. 644-45, 651-52). 
Exhibit 4 to Second Affidavit 
of Richard K. Spratley (R. 
690). 
This e-mail from Mr. Spratley to another State Farm attorney discussed 
a lawsuit directly against State Farm. In the e-mail, Mr. Spratley 
provided factual background and legal conclusions as to the effect of his 
potential testimony in the case. Mr. Spratley also referenced a previous 
recommendation he had made to State Farm in this case, in which Mr. 
Spratley had provided a candid opinion of the case's merits. The e-
mail's recipient, Dean Davis, has filed an affidavit stating that the e-
mail was strictly confidential. (See R. 660-62). Plaintiffs have not 
refuted this statement. 
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